


JPRS-TND-93-005  
12 February 1993



# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Proliferation Issues**

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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-93-005

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12 February 1993

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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## SOUTH AFRICA

### Disposal of Uranium Stockpile Causes Concern

93WP0069A Johannesburg SUNDAY STAR in English  
27 Dec 92 p 9

[Article by David Breier, political correspondent: "The Dump of Death"]

[Text]

#### Worried World: What Will S.A. Do With Uranium Stockpile?

**Nuclear nightmare:** South Africa is believed to be sitting on hundreds of kilograms of unwanted lethal, highly-enriched uranium, which nobody knows how to get rid of.

International concern is growing at South Africa's suspected stockpile of highly-enriched uranium, lethal enough to kill millions with cancer.

The uranium was enriched at Pelindaba during the "total onslaught" era when the Government developed the capability of making nuclear bombs.

Although South Africa signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) last year undertaking not to make nuclear bombs, nobody knows what to do with the dump of death now that it has no military function.

Western sources told the SUNDAY STAR they accepted that South Africa now had no possible strategic use for nuclear weapons.

But they said the real problem was that the country was lumped with the monumental headache of what to do with what is believed to be between 200 and 400 kg of weapons-grade uranium.

Bad though South Africa's problem is, it is a fraction of the headache facing Russia and the United States, which are beginning to dismantle their vast nuclear arsenals after the end of the Cold War.

The De Klerk Government signed the NPT last year, subjecting itself to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections which have reportedly revealed that South Africa had secretly produced several hundred kilograms of weapons-grade uranium in the 1970s and 1980s.

The journal NUCLEONICS WEEK estimates the country has enough weapons-grade uranium to make about 25 nuclear bombs.

The journal also claimed an IAEA short-notice inspection found equipment for making "fissile cores" for nuclear bombs at an abandoned site known as Building 5000 near the Pelindaba reactor.

The Atomic Energy Corporation has denied that nuclear bomb-making equipment was stored at the mothballed building, but the AEC [Atomic Energy Council] is not saying whether the country ever had a nuclear development programme.

This week the African National Congress [ANC], reacting to a growing number of international reports on South Africa's secret uranium stockpile accused the Government of holding the people of South Africa hostage to a possible nuclear threat.

But Western sources pointed out that a possible future ANC government would have exactly the same headache as the nuclear stockpile could not simply be destroyed, shipped away or thrown into the sea, but would be lethal for centuries.

There is also growing international concern at South Africa's continued missile development programme as rockets used to launch satellites could also be used to deliver nuclear bombs. South Africa is believed to have developed missiles jointly with Israel.



## NORTH KOREA

### Russia Criticizes Stance on Nuclear Inspections

934P0058A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jan 93 p 4

[Article by A. Zakharov: "Nuclear Dialogue in Korea: It Seems To Be At An Impasse Again"]

[Text] If it is true that history repeats itself, then it happens more frequently in Korea than anywhere else. More precisely—almost every year. In any case, the dialogue which had just gotten underway between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea is close to breaking down, as it has done many times before in the past two years.

The fact is that since the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula went into effect in February 1992, Pyongyang, under various pretexts, has been postponing the implementation of those provisions which specify conducting reciprocal inspections by the North and South of facilities on one another's territory. Disturbed by its partner's unwillingness to fulfill the commitments it has made, Seoul seriously suspects that the DPRK in the meantime is trying to complete its work for creating a nuclear weapon or to take advantage of the inspection issue to obtain concessions in other spheres of relations between North and South.

One might object that the four inspections conducted this year by IAEA have so far failed to confirm all of Seoul's suspicions. But few are bold enough to state that they have been fully put to rest, the more so since Pyongyang has admitted that it already has a "small quantity" of plutonium which it produced itself.

Yet, according to the rules of this organization, only "peaceful" nuclear installations are subject to being monitored, and only those on a list submitted by the country being inspected. The case with Iraq demonstrated to the whole world that regular IAEA inspections are clearly inadequate for countries whose governments intend to get hold of nuclear weapons no matter what.

This is why in December 1991 Seoul came out in favor of conducting reciprocal inspections which would be carried out by the two Korean parties independently of IAEA inspections. The more so since it was not at all clear when the DPRK would sign the agreement on guarantees of nuclear safety with the IAEA and ratify it. A similar position was also held by Pyongyang, which insisted on inspections of American military bases in South Korea. The fundamental agreement on this issue was registered in the Declaration of Denuclearization.

Fearing delays in working out the inspection procedures, Seoul made a proposal to conduct trial inspections of Yongbyon where, it is suspected, a plant for producing plutonium is under construction or in operation, and one of the American bases on its territory, the consent for which has already been received from the Pentagon. But the DPRK refused even to discuss the idea, declaring it "unnecessary."

A month after the ratification of the declaration on 19 March the parties created a joint commission for nuclear control, but after 12 of its meetings, from March through December of this year, they have still been unable to agree on how, when, and where to conduct these inspections. The debates have to do basically with two issues.

The first pertains to the number and nature of the facilities subject to inspection. The North agreed to allow representatives of Seoul only in Yongbyon, demanding in exchange that U.S. "nuclear bases" in South Korea be opened up, including in this category all American military facilities in the country. The South, although it did not insist on numerical equality, of course, could not agree to such unequal conditions and suggested determining the maximum possible number of facilities subject to inspection during the year on the territory of each side, so that each could choose from this list. Taking into account Pyongyang's fears that the inspections might affect regions that are politically sensitive for the DPRK, for example, the camp of the North Korean GULAG, Seoul also stated that it was ready for compromise regarding the methods and frequency of conducting inspections and also the selection of facilities.

The second one is related to Seoul's proposal to conduct, in addition to regular inspections, unannounced ones whereby the inspecting party chooses for itself the facility arousing its suspicion and announces this 24 hours in advance. Only such inspections, Seoul emphasizes, can ultimately remove suspicion. The DPRK's decisive rejection of this kind of monitoring is even stranger since, if it had agreed to it, Pyongyang would also have had the opportunity to back up its loud accusations that there are still nuclear weapons in South Korea or they could be shipped there again.

Possibly the innocence of both parties could have been questioned were it not for one circumstance. After the eighth round of negotiations by the prime ministers in September 1992, Pyongyang openly entered on a course of sabotaging the inter-Korean dialogue along all lines. To do this it used a tested pretext—the military maneuvers, above all "Team Spirit," in South Korea. As though military maneuvers were never conducted in the North!

In 1992 the "Team Spirit" maneuvers were canceled, almost a year remained before the next training sessions (they are conducted in the spring), and the question of their resumption had not yet been officially discussed at the time. Nonetheless on 4 July the North Korean Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Homeland sent out a warning about the "serious consequences" which could ensue from the resumption of maneuvers next year.

Still in October at the regular consultations on security the United States and the Republic of Korea agreed to continue preparations for their regular "Team Spirit" maneuvers, justifying this decision by the unwillingness of the DPRK to solve the nuclear problem. Let us note that this has to do only with regular preparations and not the decision to hold maneuvers, which will be made at the beginning of 1993. Moreover the new prime minister of the Republic of Korea, Hyon Sung-chong, sent a message to his North Korean colleague which said that if Pyongyang would meet Seoul

halfway on the nuclear problem, the plans for conducting the training would be canceled. Moreover, Washington and Seoul expressed their readiness to revise their decision to postpone the second phase of the reduction of American troops in the south of the peninsula.

But this was not to be! Pyongyang had already resorted to its favorite device with which for the past 16 years, with dazzling consistency, almost every year, it had frozen all contacts between the North and South for at least a half year and sometimes for a much longer period of time. In a joint declaration of the government, the political parties, and the social organizations of the DPRK of 27 October it was asserted that future maneuvers would "drive the situation on the Korean peninsula backward, to the times of confrontation."

At the next regular meeting of the Nuclear Control Commission on 27 November, Pyongyang threatened to cut off all contacts with Seoul, including negotiations at the level of prime ministers and the work of the joint commissions, if the Republic of Korea did not announce its cancellation of the maneuvers. At the next meeting, on 10 December, representatives of the DPRK flatly refused to discuss anything except the question of canceling the "Team Spirit" maneuvers.

Many observers explain Pyongyang's intransigence by its desire once again, as was the case with the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the Republic of Korea at the end of last year, to play the "nuclear card" and achieve at least a purely moral victory over its opponents by forcing them to cancel maneuvers. It is also important to the North Korean regime to demonstrate both to its population and to the whole world that it does not intend to give in to any pressure.

#### **Russian Envoy Urges Pyongyang To Abide By NPT**

LD0102094793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0909 GMT 1 Feb 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Nadashkevich]

[Text] Pyongyang February 1 TASS—A Russian envoy called on the North Korean leadership to abide by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and refrain from closing its nuclear objects for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

"We have made it clear to the People's Democratic Republic of Korea that we expect it to fully comply with its commitments envisaged by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, in particular, concerning the agreement with the IAEA on inspections of nuclear objects, and expressed concern over possible aggravation of relations between the DPRK and the IAEA", Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Kunadze told TASS on Monday upon completing his political consultations with North Korean colleagues.

On Friday the North Korean ambassador in Moscow warned that his country may close its nuclear objects for IAEA inspections if the joint U.S.-South Korean "Team Spirit" military exercise takes place in March.

"I want to stress in particular that the relations (between North Korea and the IAEA) are not an internal affair of Pyongyang", Kunadze said, adding that every U.N. member should avoid such actions which result in international problems.

However, Kunadze acknowledged that the North Korean position on the situation on the Korean peninsula is "rather tough and it was hard to reach agreements".

Still the deputy foreign minister said the situation should not be dramatized and the dialogue is to be continued. "Relations cannot develop by ignoring existing discrepancies in positions", he said.

Russia also expressed its concern over the delay in solving the issue of an inter-Korean nuclear inspection, over the approach of Pyongyang to South Korea which it does not want to recognize as a state. As far as joining the chemical arms banning convention is concerned, North Korea will "think about it if it corresponds to its national interests", Kunadze said, adding that North Korean reaction to the issues was "painful".

The consultations on problems of bilateral relations were more fruitful, according to Kunadze, who said that both sides "pledged mutual desire to raise the relations to a qualitatively new level". Russia and North Korea agreed that the 1961 Cooperation Treaty should be changed according to existing realities.

During the visit to South Korea last year President Boris Yeltsin said that the article on Russian military assistance to North Korea should be dropped from the treaty.

Russia also raised the issue of North Korean debt and said its trade with Pyongyang would be based on "purely commercial" interests, according to Kunadze.

"It is good that we have met and talked in a frank and businesslike manner which promoted an understanding between the sides on the necessity to get rid of illusions in each other's positions", he stressed.

The official "RODONG SHINMUN" newspaper said that Kunadze's talks with North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam and his first deputy were held in a "friendly atmosphere".

#### **Envoy to Russia Says IAEA Held Inspections**

SK0402085393 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean  
1000 GMT 3 Feb 93

[Report on a news conference held by DPRK Ambassador to Russia Son Song-pil, with Russian reporters in Moscow on 2 February, from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] Ambassador Son Song-pil elaborated on the 30 January statement by a spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry on the possibility of Japan's election as permanent member of the UN Security Council.

[Begin Son Song-pil recording] As mentioned in the statement by our Foreign Ministry spokesman, Japan has persistently tried to become a permanent member of the UN

Security Council. Whether we will allow this maneuver by Japan or not is, first of all, a serious issue that determines whether we will allow Japan to revive militarism or not. We believe that Japan is in no way qualified to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council and that we cannot allow it to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

The first reason is that Japan, a war criminal that provoked World War II, has not liquidated its grave crimes at that time. As we know, Japan provoked the Pacific war. It occupied our country and many other Asian countries, murdered and plundered people of these countries, and inflicted incalculable calamities on them.

Take our country as an example, Japan murdered approximately a million innocent people of ours during its occupation of our country. During the war, it drafted 200,000 of our women, and Japanese troops toyed with them as sex objects or sex slaves. Japan has not honestly apologized and liquidated its crimes during World War II, however.

The second reason is that Japan has been embarking upon a road to becoming a military power, a militarist road, without cleaning up its crimes, thus creating a grave threat to peace in Asia. Among countries of the world, Japan spends the largest percentage of the state budget on the military, and the rate military expenses growth rate is the highest.

As we know, Japan has stored a large amount of plutonium, more than is necessary. It produces plutonium and imports it from many countries. Japan possesses 26 tons of plutonium. This is enough to make 3,000 times the equivalent of the nuclear bomb that was dropped over Nagasaki, Japan.

Given Japan's scientific and technological level, if it intends to manufacture atomic shells with the plutonium, Japan will be able to manufacture nuclear weapons in a matter of a few months.

The United States, South Korea, and various other countries openly say that Japan has been accelerating a nuclear buildup. For example, South Korea has clamored that it must accelerate its nuclear development independently. [end recording]

Ambassador Son Song-pil also introduced a memorandum of the DPRK Foreign Ministry. The memorandum deals with the ROK's nuclear program and possibility of developing nuclear weapons.

[Begin Son Song-pil recording] South Korea's nuclear development has been going on in a comprehensive manner, beginning with the development of nuclear technology, [word indistinct] of nuclear weapons, tests of nuclear weapons, and deployment of nuclear weapons for actual combat purposes.

We issued this memorandum because [words indistinct], lured by the loud propaganda by the United States, Japan, and the South Korean authorities without paying attention to South Korea's development of nuclear weapons, which creates a regional nuclear threat, on the Korean peninsula.

As we have declared on many occasions, we have no capability or intention to build nuclear weapons. We are sincerely receiving nuclear inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. What is called a nuclear threat is pure (?fiction). We advanced various proposals to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone and have been making efforts to put them into practice.

I think governments and conscientious people of all countries of the world must clearly know where a nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula comes from and unanimously raise their voice to remove it. [end recording]

Reporters asked Son: Will the DPRK resume talks with Japan on normalizing bilateral relations and he answered:

This totally depends on Japan's attitude. Japan is responsible for the recess of the talks. Japan raised issues that have nothing to do with the talks. We are willing to resume the talks anytime.

Unidentified reporters asked him if he could prove what the KYODO News Agency reported some time ago, that the DPRK rejected the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA inspection of nuclear facilities in the Yonbyon area.

Ambassador Son Song-pil said that he would like to answer this question in detail. Inspectors of the IAEA, who recently visited the DPRK, attempted to inspect some nuclear facilities near the Yongbyon Research Institute [words indistinct]. [Words indistinct] the IAEA could not inspect them. However, to dissolve unnecessary suspicions, the DPRK allowed them to look over the military facilities. They looked over these facilities twice. Nevertheless, the inspection team was not satisfied with this. The inspection team asked the DPRK to carry out drilling to confirm what facilities were buried in the ground. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had provided this kind of material to the IAEA. We (?think) that this is contrary to the basic paragraphs of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ambassador Son Song-pil said that according to our view, the inspection by the IAEA should not be based on the data of a third country's intelligence agency.

#### Foreign Ministry on Inspection Issue

SK0802000893 *Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean* 2217 GMT 7 Feb 93

[Text] On 7 February the DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman answered a KCNA reporter's question about how some Western press and publications are creating erroneous public opinion on the normalizing of relations between the DPRK and Japan and the DPRK and the United States and on our nuclear inspection issue. They are saying that if the nuclear issue is not resolved, normalization of DPRK-Japan and DPRK-U.S. relations cannot be realized and so on.

Some Western press and publications have recently created erroneous public opinion by saying that we are trying to improve DPRK-Japan and DPRK-U.S. relations because we are hoping for something. They are babbling that all problems will be solved when the nuclear issue is resolved.



Nuclear inspection is an issue that we and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] should resolve. Nevertheless, the South Korean authorities and some countries, including the United States and Japan, are continuing to raise this as some kind of condition to improve relations. This is truly no way to resolve the nuclear issue; rather, it is being used as leverage to isolate and crush our republic.

Our people are very proud and regard the nation's dignity and independence as more important than life. We will not try to improve DPRK-Japan and DPRK-U.S. relations by allowing unreasonable interference in internal affairs or pressure from outside. We have never even thought about improving relations that way.

We do not want to improve relations with Japan or the United States by having our national dignity and sovereign rights infringed upon. We will resolve the issue of improving relations with them only under the condition that our sovereign rights are respected and when the principle of equality is guaranteed.

Some Western press and publications are babbling as if nuclear inspection stalemated because we rejected part of the nuclear inspection. This is fictitious and a fabrication, and it contradicts the truth. In reality, we are receiving inspection from the IAEA. In addition, we are continuing normal negotiations with the IAEA.

Through the IAEA's many nonregular inspections [pijonggi sachal] in our country, the innocent nature of our republic's nuclear policy to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes has been clearly proved.

Nevertheless, some classes and circles in the United States are spreading a false rumor that there are objects we have not reported to the IAEA, attempting to link them to our military objects. We have neither any contradictory point [mosunjom] talked about by Americans nor objects that we have not reported.

The United States wants to enforce inspection of military objects that have nothing to do with nuclear activities and is spreading the opinion that if we do not accept this inspection, special inspection must be applied. The military objects, which have nothing to do with nuclear issue, are not objects for inspection according to the Nuclear Safeguards Accord.

Moreover, talking about an inspection of objects based on intelligence offered by a certain country has no any legal basis according to the IAEA's regulations and the Nuclear Safeguards Accord, which was concluded between us and the agency.

The intelligence and satellite materials offered by a third country for the agency's use in inspection was raised in a meeting of the IAEA's Board of Governors in December 1991. It was voted down due to its members' strong opposition and rejection, however.

Therefore, the IAEA has no right to use the intelligence offered by a certain country for either nonregular inspections or special inspections [tukpyol sachal].

The United States attempted to open [kaebang] our military objects and bases via North-South mutual inspections. Since this did not happen, the United States is trying to achieve its insidious purpose by using the IAEA, however.

The demand for inspection of military objects is related to the erroneous U.S. policy on Korea that infringes upon our sovereignty. It is a very serious military and political issue intended to make the IAEA interfere. Opening our military objects in response to the demand for such and inspection means the beginning of exposing all of our military objects and bases.

We absolutely will not accept nor tolerate anything that infringes on the nation's sovereignty and security. Infringing upon our dignity and sovereignty by distorting the truth and spreading false public opinion will only create artificial obstacles and barriers to satisfactorily advancing nuclear inspections.

The IAEA's nonregular inspection is proceeding satisfactorily. At this very time, if any unjust act is forced upon us as a result of an attempt to use the problems for military and political purposes, problems that should be resolved between us and the agency, we will have to take corresponding self-defense measures. Moreover, if any consequences result, those who caused them will be held totally responsible.

## SOUTH KOREA

### North Urged To Return to Conference Table

SK0202073593 Seoul YONHAP in English 0703 GMT  
2 Feb 93

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 2 (YONHAP)—South Korea accused North Korea of breaking off dialogue so that it wouldn't be pressed to allow mutual nuclear inspections Tuesday, and urged the hardline Stalinist state to return to the conference table.

"We can't help but think that the North is aiming to delay the implementation of the inter-Korean basic agreement and the solution of the nuclear issue because it is trying to shut down all dialogue channels by citing unreasonable excuses," said Kong No-myong, Seoul-side spokesman for the inter-Korean prime ministers' talks.

All inter-Korean agreements should be observed under any circumstances and dialogue should continue, he said, commenting on North Korea's declaration Jan. 29 that it had no intention to resume talks of all official channels, including the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC).

Kong called on Pyongyang to normalize all dialogue instantly and unconditionally. South and North should solve all problems through dialogue in accordance with the basic agreement signed in December 1991, he said.

Expressing regret, Kong urged Pyongyang to restart the JNCC contacts to map out a regime for mutual inspections of nuclear facilities.

North Korea must eradicate suspicion of nuclear weapons development by enabling the JNCC to initial the rules of mutual inspections through working-level contacts, he said.

## POLAND

**State Protection Office 'Aware' of Uranium Purchase Offer***LD0702215293 Warsaw PAP in English 2138 GMT  
7 Feb 93*

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 7—The State Protection Office (UOP) had been aware of the offer to buy radioactive uranium from Poland before German television's programme about it, Head of the State Protection Office Jerzy Konieczny said in a TV interview on Sunday.

Konieczny stressed that success in his work means the liquidation of a whole group and not only a single criminal ring which may, sometimes, take more time. He added that several deals in which radioactive materials from the former Soviet Union were involved, ended up in court, though media did not give them much publicity.

Kazimerz C., deputy minister of culture in the years 1986-89 and his partner Waldemar M., who were filmed with a hidden camera in one of Warsaw hotels last December while discussing with the radioactive uranium sale to German journalists posing as businessmen, were arrested on January 19.

According to Konieczny the transfer of large amounts of radioactive materials does not run across Poland where only negotiations are usually held.

## FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

**Tuzla Defenders To Use CW Against Chetnik Attacks***LD0702230693 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina  
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Feb 93*

[Text] A decision was made in Tuzla today on the concept of defending the Tuzla area by using chemicals. Salih Brkic reports:

[Brkic] The aggression and brutal chetnik attacks continue unabated. About 8,000 refugees arrived in Tuzla from Kamenica, Konjevic Polje, and Cerska, and another 25,000 left their homes in the Drina river valley.

After consultations with representatives of regional municipalities, the presidency of the Tuzla regional assembly has made a decision providing for a strategy of using chemicals in the defense of Tuzla region. The presidency's statement says that since not a single aid convoy with goods for the Tuzla area has arrived for a month, and relentless attacks continue, it has been decided that all means should be used in the defense, including chemical substances available in the region. By preventing us from obtaining the necessary weapons to defend ourselves, the international community is breaching the main principles of international law, leaving us no other alternative but to use all available means to save the lives of more than 1 million people facing the threat of destruction by the Serbian and Montenegrin aggressor.

Hunger, winter, disease and chetnik knives are already taking their tragic toll throughout the besieged areas of

Kamenica, Cerska, and Konjevic Polje. If nothing is done, the situation will soon be no better in Tuzla, Zivinice, Lukavac, Srebrenik and other free municipalities of the Tuzla region.

Our decision to use chemical resources is final. We have issued enough futile warnings and appeals and have tried to find solutions in some other way. The situation facing the population in our area is such that we have no other choice. As of now chemical substances will be distributed along all frontlines and the evacuation of the population from the threatened areas will be conducted in due time.

The world was previously warned of the consequences of the possible use of chemicals and of the radius of their lethal effect. We will issue no more warnings, the statement of the presidency of the Tuzla regional assembly states. If roads in Herzegovina and central Bosnia are not unblocked as soon as possible; if Dubrave airport, which is now fully operational, is not reopened; and if there is no other way out, we will start to use the chemicals distributed on the frontlines. Our decision is final and this time everyone should take note of it. We wish to inform the local population that all protection measures have been taken and that there is no reason for panic, the statement says in conclusion.

**UN To Investigate Threat***AU0802123293 Paris AFP in English 1141 GMT  
8 Feb 93*

[Text] Sarajevo, Feb 8 (AFP)—The U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina will investigate reports that local leaders in the northeastern Tuzla area are ready to unleash chemicals against Serb forces.

Pollution of local rivers and creeks feeding into the big Sava River with a substance such as a cyanide compound could carry all the way to the Serbian capital of Belgrade, then through Romania and into the Black Sea.

A cloud of chlorine or similar gas could devastate entire military units and spread over a large area.

UNPROFOR spokesman Barry Frewer said Monday [8 February] that the force had heard the reports that the regional leadership was ready to use chemicals—bidden under the Geneva Convention on warfare—but had not confirmed them.

"We'll definitely look into it," Frewer said, "and we'll see... if these unconfirmed reports are substantiated."

Bosnian media reported that the presidency of the area, which is a chemical producing region, had decided to use the chemicals because no conventional weapons were being supplied from abroad, the result of an international arms embargo against all warring parties in the former Yugoslavia.

Some of the chemicals have already been placed along the front lines, the media reported.

It said the regional leadership had promised that civilians would be evacuated before the chemicals were unleashed.

The type of chemicals to be used was not specified.

The regional presidency also announced last October that it had placed chemicals in containers—the type carried on container ships—at strategic points for a few days.

It was believed then that if the containers had indeed been set up with chemicals in them that they would be a chlorine compound.

It was possible, however, that the announcement was a bluff to intimidate the Serb forces.

The area has seen heavy fighting between the Serb forces and the Bosnian army.

Thousands of Moslem refugees expelled by Serb troops—as part of their policy of “ethnic cleansing”—from towns and villages near the Drina River, separating Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbia, are now trekking into the Tuzla area, straining its resources.

Radio amateurs in the eastern town of Srebrenica reported on January 29 that thousands of Serbian troops had crossed the Drina to aid local Serb forces, and had polluted local rivers with unidentified substances as they pillaged and burned Moslem villages.

Those reports have not been confirmed by the U.N. Protection Force, which has no troops in that area.

A British U.N. battalion is stationed in the Tuzla area, however.

#### **‘No Proof’ Established**

*AU0802140593 Paris AFP in English 1335 GMT  
8 Feb 93*

[Text] Sarajevo, Feb 8 (AFP)—Frewer said later that a check had turned up no proof of the deployment of chemical substances in the area.

“In our view of the area, there has been no introduction of chemical substances,” he said.

Frewer said the U.N. force had received reports during the war of the use of the sort of crowd control gas used by police forces around the world, but had never verified the use of chemical substances banned by the Geneva convention.

#### **Croatian Nuclear Program Aims Questioned**

*934P0061A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jan 93  
pp 1, 3*

[Report by Yevgeniy Fadeyev: “A Croatian Atomic Bomb?”]

[Text] Belgrade—First information on this delicate subject appeared in my journalist’s notebook in October 1991. The prestigious Belgrade BORBA published a report, referring to the newspaper NARODNA ARMIYA, to the effect that the Rudjer Boskovic Institute of Nuclear Research in Zagreb was engaged in work connected with the production of an atomic bomb....

Let me make a small digression here. This institute was not a secret facility. In the early 1950’s in Yugoslavia, along with it, two related scientific research institutes were set up not far from Belgrade, in Vinca and Ljubljana. The Croatian

nuclear potential was laid during the time of the activity of the Union Commission on Nuclear Power Engineering. One of its main programs was to construct a joint Slovene-Croatian nuclear power station.

On 1 December 1975 the president of Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito, laid the foundation stone for the electric power station in the town of Krsko, 100 kilometers from Ljubljana and 40 kilometers from Belgrade. This first-born was built by several Yugoslav companies cooperating with the American Westinghouse Company: Westinghouse “assumed” responsibility for the heart of the nuclear power station—the nuclear reactor... In 1981 Krsko was put into operation. The nuclear power station on the border between Slovenia and Croatia was thus, and remains, the only one in the country. It was planned to build a second in the late 1980’s at the town of Prevlaka near Zagreb. But in 1987 the Yugoslav parliament decided to introduce a moratorium on the construction of nuclear electric power stations in the country until the year 2000.

But let us return to the journalist’s notebook. At the very beginning of 1992 the new Belgrade sociopolitical journal EPOKHA made its debut with sensational material—“The Croatian Atomic Bomb.” It was stated in the material that the issue was that although the program of the Union Commission on Nuclear Power Engineering “was far removed from military purposes and did not set any task of producing an atomic bomb in Yugoslavia,” on orders from the new leaders sent to Croatia the Rudjer Boskovic Institute in Zagreb is engaged in research connected with the production of an atomic bomb. An answer to the question, the journal stated, can be provided only by the republic leadership and the Croatian nuclear scientists.

The leadership of the Zagreb institute issued a denial and sent an official letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in Vienna. They had one request—to send experts to Zagreb so that they could be convinced with their own eyes that no work connected with the production of an atomic bomb was being done at the institute. Moreover, the scientists in Zagreb did not even have a single plan for such a range of problems. But, let me remind you, a fierce war was under way, and the commission could not go. Many believed that the EPOKHA statement was merely a canard.

...But at that time (and not many people knew this) an adviser for the newly elected Croatian president, the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, F. Tudjman, and an engineer named Hrvoje Sharinic cooperated with several nuclear laboratories in the Republic of South Africa. Even earlier, during the 1980’s, he had represented the French nuclear industry in Zagreb. We have already mentioned the plans to build the Croatian nuclear power station, and it was Sharinic who was responsible for this project....

Several months ago (the flames of war had, thank God, been damped down and the UN “blue berets” had arrived and driven through a Serbian and Croatian corridor) there was a change of the Cabinet of Ministers in Croatia. The new government was led by the erstwhile adviser to the president, an engineer, yes, you guessed it—H. Sharinic. In the republic itself he was immediately named “the nuclear

premier." Why? With his arrival the idea of continuing construction of the nuclear power station in Prevlaka was revived.

The Zagreb journal GLOBUS publishes a photo spread: The prime minister sitting behind a desk with the background a panorama of the future nuclear power station. So what about the moratorium on the construction of nuclear power stations adopted five years ago in Yugoslavia? In Croatia it is not in effect: Croatia has become an independent state.

Well fine, a power station is a power station. Recently in certain circles they have once again started to talk about a Croatian atomic bomb. Let me cite one fact that caused an international scandal.

Late last year a specially trained group of police from Germany, Austria, and Switzerland went to Munich in an operation to seize an international "nuclear mafia" made up of 19 people. At the time of the arrests the criminals were found to have 2.2 kilograms of enriched uranium prepared for dispatch to Zagreb. The mafia boss turned out to be a 50-year-old Catholic priest, Josip Vidic, who was born in Croatia but left there 23 years ago for Germany.

Following this police raid the German press was unanimous: Croatia is trying at any price to acquire an atomic bomb.

Now the spiciest item of all. The "goods" seized in Munich were just part of 21 kilograms of a shipment of uranium that arrived in Germany via Poland from the former Soviet Union. But that is another story.

So, are they working today in Croatia to develop nuclear weapons? From the IAEA in Vienna to Zagreb is, as they say, only a stone's throw away, a couple of hours in a car....

### Daily Says Belgrade Hiding Nuclear Material

93P20085A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 20 Jan 93 p 1

[Report from DUMA correspondent in Belgrade: "Belgrade Hides Radioactive Material Near Bulgarian Border"]

[Text] Eleven containers of "low-grade" radioactive material have been secretly hidden in an abandoned mine in Gabrovica, in Stara Planina, not far from Knjazevac, and relatively close to Ciprovi. The announcement provoked great alarm among the inhabitants of the Knjazevac and Timoski regions. The material was sent there from the Institute for Technology of Nuclear and Other Raw Materials in Belgrade without the knowledge of any official institution whatsoever and without informing official bodies. After the scandal erupted, the special commission of the Serbian Ministry for Environmental Protection ascertained that the 11 containers held "semifinished products" with low-level natural uranium. According to the official announcement, 300 kilograms of uranium dioxide and ammonium diuranate is involved.

In this connection, we should recall Academician Petrovic's report, which indicated that the water in the Timok River is completely contaminated with the radioactive isotope tritium. The Serbian Ministry for Ecology [as published] declared that the traces of this isotope in the river were completely harmless and did not come from the mine but from space [Kosmos]. Last summer there were also alarming reports about increased levels of radioactivity in the water of the Timok River and in the Timoski region, but they were also denied. The population of the Stara Planina region is insisting on the immediate removal of the radioactive material, which makes this region unattractive to tourists.



## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Meeting on Nuclear Technology Ends in Santiago

PY0602123193 Santiago *EL MERCURIO* in Spanish  
1 Feb 93 p C2

[Text] A planning meeting of the program "Regional Cooperative Agreements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America" (ARCAL) has ended in Santiago. ARCAL depends on the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].

The Santiago meeting was organized by the "ARCAL Strategic Planning and Development" working group, the objective of which was to study the regional information and background that will help achieve a greater "projection in the productive system of the technological capacity in the nuclear area."

The following issues were discussed at the meeting: opportunities to transfer technology in the nuclear area and detection of opportunities for technological transfer in the productive area.

Meeting participants also analyzed research and development from the point of view of its incorporation into the national and regional economic cycle, and strategies for the use of nuclear and radioactive know-how and installations existing in the region.

ARCAL currently comprises 15 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela.

The ARCAL program is based on the idea of cooperation among the participating countries.

On sharing the available infrastructure, including laboratories, equipment, and experts, ARCAL has encouraged regional efforts, which have given birth to regional financing for expenditures resulting from project activities.

The organization also is helping find the necessary financial support for the implementation of projects, either by channeling their own resources or by obtaining them from other countries or institutions. For instance, Canada, the EEC, the United States, France, Italy, Germany, and Sweden have supported ARCAL projects.

## BRAZIL

### Russians To Develop Fuel for Launch Vehicle

93SM0135Z Sao Paulo *GAZETA MERCANTIL* in Portuguese 23-25 Jan 93 p 5

[Article by Brasilia correspondent Luiza Pastor]

[Text] Pernambuco State PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party] Senator Mansueto de Lavor, rapporteur for the Joint Congressional Budget Committee, has decided

to reconsider the appropriation he had earmarked for the Brazilian space program, in which only 16 billion cruzeiros of the 70 billion cruzeiros requested by the Brazilian Aerospace Commission (COBAE) were allocated for the development of the Satellite Launch Vehicle (VLS).

Mansueto de Lavor expressed his irritation with the repeated changes in the launch date of the SCD-1 and assured *GAZETA MERCANTIL* that he intends to reexamine the appropriations for research and development to see how much is still possible to allocate to the Brazilian rocket project, as well as for the development of the Alcantara Launch Center (CLA) in Maranhao State. That base, which is advantageously located from the standpoint of international competition, would, if completed, enable Brazil to be included in the exclusive club of countries that compete in the satellite launch market.

Additional information that predisposes the senator to release more funds for the mission is that a group of 12 Russian scientists contacted [as published] by the Aerospace Technical Center (CTA) is already in Brazil, having been invited to work on the project to develop fuel for the three stages of the launch vehicle. The presence of those scientists was confirmed to *GAZETA MERCANTIL* this week by Colonel Freitas Bastos, executive director of COBAE, who cautioned that the contracting of the Russians was "still extra-official" since it has not been submitted to the plenary of the Committee for ratification.

"We cannot have these brains here in Brazil without a function that enables them to be well utilized," Mansueto de Lavor emphasized. However, the latest partial figures from his report show that 67 percent of the Union budget funds will go to pay off the public debt, and only 1.4 percent is to be spent under the heading of projects and development of the country in general. Under the item for science and technology, which covers not only the ministry but all the research fields in the various areas of the Executive Branch, the total budget forecast by Mansueto de Lavor is 2.37 trillion cruzeiros—of which the Ministry of Science and Technology itself will get only \$1.78 trillion cruzeiros, in April 1992 values. Those sums, the budget committee advisers explain, will have to be updated by multiplying them by a factor yet to be determined, but that will be somewhere between 15 and 20.

Regarding the space mission, the VLS has 16.2 billion cruzeiros available so far, and the program to develop the SCD-2, the satellite that will be the successor to the SCD-1, is getting \$1.8 billion cruzeiros; the installation of the base at Alcantara, in turn, received an appropriation of 8.8 billion cruzeiros.

The situation is not very different in other areas of high-tech research. According to the senator, the budget sought by the Navy Ministry, for example, called for only \$2.3 billion cruzeiros under the heading of research and development, with the specific program for the Antarctic not being separately listed. In his final version of the report, he obligated

1.9 billion cruzeiros to the research being done in that region.

whom Chile has very good relations, could have made such allegations, although in an indirect form.

### CHILE

#### Reports on Arms Possession, Production Rejected

##### Russian Report of CWs Denied

LD0802041693 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya  
Ostankino Television First Program Network in  
Russian 0300 GMT 8 Feb 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The Russian intelligence service may find itself at the center of a sudden diplomatic conflict between Russia and Chile. The Chilean Embassy in Moscow has asked for additional information in connection with a statement made by Russian officials. The statement in question was made at a recent news conference by the leadership of the Russian external intelligence service. A report presented during the news conference mentioned Chile among the countries possessing chemical weapons. The Chilean authorities have issued a special statement in connection with this saying the country has never conducted any research aimed at producing chemical weapons. The Chilean authorities said that they found it inconceivable that a representative of the Russian Government, with

##### N-Arms Production 'Categorically Denied'

PY0602024793 Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish  
30 Jan 93 p C4

[Excerpt] Acting Foreign Minister Edmund Vargas has categorically denied that Chile is manufacturing chemical and nuclear weapons, adding that on the contrary, our country has permanently advocated the proscription of such weapons.

"The Chilean position is absolutely unambiguous, and so is our commitment to the cause of the total and definitive elimination of those weapons, which we do not have," Vargas said.

He said that as far as he knows, neither the previous nor the current government have ever intended to produce chemical or nuclear weapons, and that the National Nuclear Energy Commission budget has never included allocations for military research.

He added that Chile's sole two "modest" reactors have been used only for doing research in the food and energy areas. [passage omitted]

## INDIA

### Medium Range Surface-to-Surface Missile Tested

BK0702125393 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 1230 GMT 7 Feb 93

[Text] India's indigenously developed surface-to-surface medium range missile, Prithvi [earth], has been test launched. Official sources said the missile with the range of 250 km was test fired from a mobile launcher at 1350 [0820 GMT] this afternoon from the interim test range in Chandipur, Orissa. The scientific adviser in the Defense Ministry, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, and a number of top scientists were present on the occasion. This was the fourth test firing of the missile from the interim test range and the 10th in the series.

## IRAQ

### IAEA Says Never Given List of Nuclear Suppliers

PM0102095593 Rome AVANTI! in Italian 28 Jan 93 p 12

[Unattributed report on an ANSA telephone interview with UN weapons inspector Maurizio Zifferero in Iraq; date not given]

[Text] The Iraqis never gave IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] experts any list of nuclear materiel suppliers, and what was considered a "goodwill gesture" on Saddam Husayn's part arose from an involuntary misunderstanding on the part of foreign journalists in Baghdad, IAEA Deputy Director Maurizio Zifferero, aged 62, who is in Iraq heading a team of eight nuclear experts, told ANSA yesterday. Reached over the telephone in the Baghdad hotel where he is staying, Professor Zifferero also said that the article in which the NEW YORKER weekly accused him a couple of days ago of playing for Saddam is probably the result of a "certain personal animosity" on the part of one of the inspectors who preceded him. Zifferero then added: "On the list of suppliers issue, I think there was a misunderstanding with the journalists who were here. I never claimed that the Iraqis gave us a list. I merely said that during our inspections, we discovered evidence that a certain number of firms, most of whose exports to Iraq were probably perfectly legitimate, were taking part in Iraq's nuclear research." "Furthermore," Zifferero added, "when discussing their nuclear program with us, the Iraqis mentioned a certain number of other firms to which they had turned in order to obtain supplies or other forms of contract." "Adding the company names contained in the documents handed over by the Iraqis to those of other firms which we discovered during our inspections," the IAEA deputy director added, "we came up with a given total. At that point, the Iraqis said to us: 'Now you have more than 90 percent, or almost 90 percent, of all those from whom we have sought to obtain supplies.'"

"This is an Iraqi declaration," Zifferero stressed; "now, here, the press are interpreting it to mean that the Iraqis gave us a list. But that is not true. These are old data which we gathered a few months ago." Zifferero was asked what his team would do if they were in possession of the complete

list of Iraq's nuclear materiel suppliers and if they would make it known. "The firms' names," he answered, "are contained in the inspection reports which are distributed to all the IAEA member governments, and a copy is also sent to the UN Security Council. They are fairly public documents, inasmuch as there is ready access to them. Judging by what happens in the United States, for instance, the day after we have sent them the documents are already in the hands of the press, because they are distributed by the Security Council and are in practice common knowledge." As for the possibility of Italian firms being included, Zifferero answered that the list contains "firms from all over the world. We do not divulge their names to the press, because the governments have first to make investigations in order to ascertain whether they have exported materiel in violation of national laws. We can only indicate the names and the object of the transaction. Then it becomes the governments' task to establish whether there has been any violation of the law. We cannot lay blame at anyone's door without first becoming thoroughly acquainted with the facts."

## PAKISTAN

### U.S. Policy on Nuclear Proliferation 'Discriminatory'

BK0202102993 Islamabad THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 2 Feb 93 p 6

[Editorial: "A Timely Call"]

[Text] Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad has called upon the new US Administration to review the outdated Pressler Amendment which has failed to check nuclear proliferation in the South Asian region in view of the nuclear supremacy achieved by India. New Delhi has not only developed nuclear bombs but is also producing missile systems which would be advanced enough by the year 2000 to hit even the targets in the US. The continued existence of the Pressler Amendment would thus not only be damaging to the American interests in this region but would also have a severely negative impact on Pak-US relations. He hoped the Clinton Administration would come up with a proposal which could genuinely control nuclear proliferation in South Asia on the basis of equality and non-discrimination. He said it should also be noted by the US policymakers that although the cold war had come to an end, Russia, as a country, has the potential to again become a superpower. Therefore in the existing circumstances, there is a need for the US to adopt a more comprehensive and balanced approach to tackle the nuclear issue. Meanwhile, the prestigious NEW YORK TIMES has in its editorial urged the US and its Western allies to use their leverage to persuade India to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons so as to end the risk of a nuclear war in South Asia. The paper said that India has been "balking" on the nuclear issue.

Unfortunately, the Pressler Amendment, with its avowed objective of achieving non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, has been used as a stick to beat Pakistan with on one pretext or the other. Pakistan has often been singled out for discriminatory treatment by the developed world, especially by the US, in matters having a crucial bearing on

its technological progress and survival. An instance of such discrimination was the reversal in 1991 by a joint session of the House of Representatives and the US Senate of an earlier decision under which the US President was required to certify the non-possession by both India and Pakistan of military capability in nuclear arms in order for them to qualify for US aid. The reversal made the discriminatory law applicable only to Pakistan while India, despite its demonstrable nuclear capability, was given a blanket exception. This was done despite the fact that India had already become the world's sixth confirmed nuclear power way back in 1974 with the explosion of its "peaceful" nuclear device! New Delhi has since entered the missile age with the development of its surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads to long-distance targets. In addition, it has brazenly refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in spite of the fact that China has already done so; and Pakistan has expressed its readiness time and again to sign it simultaneously with India. Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad's call to the new US Administration to review the outdated Pressler Amendment is thus both timely and crucial. The Clinton administration should therefore do away with this discriminatory law and instead concentrate on finding ways and means to check the Indian nuclear ambitions which are already threatening the peace and stability of this region.

#### **Talks With Japan Planned on Nuclear Proliferation**

*OW0302075893 Tokyo KYODO in English 0650 GMT 3 Feb 93*

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 3 KYODO—Japan and Pakistan will hold talks on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in Islamabad on February 11, the Foreign Ministry announced Wednesday.

Officials said the talks will address Japan's desire to see Pakistan become a party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, as well as to determine the state of Pakistan's nuclear program.

The planned talks stem from a Japanese proposal made during a meeting in Tokyo in December between Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa.

Officials said that India, Pakistan's archrival, has also agreed to hold similar consultations with Japan, though a date has not yet been set.

Sharif was quoted as saying last Friday [29 January] that Pakistan had acquired the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, but has taken a conscious decision not to.

The Pakistani Foreign Ministry declared on January 27 that it would not accept any unilateral restrictions on its nuclear program.

Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) reported in Moscow last Thursday that Pakistan is in possession of four to seven nuclear bombs.

In December, the U.S. television company NBC quoted a report by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) saying

Pakistan has at least seven nuclear weapons, but the report was categorically denied by the Pakistani Government.

#### **Sharif Says Nuclear Program Not Weapons-Oriented**

*BK0202150093 Islamabad PTV Television Network in English 1400 GMT 2 Feb 93*

[Text] The prime minister, Mr. Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, has said Pakistan's nuclear program is not weapon-oriented. In an interview with *INDONESIAN OBSERVER* of Jakarta, the prime minister said Pakistan is committed to the goal of nuclear nonproliferation at the regional as well as global level. Pakistan's nuclear program is geared for the purposes of economic and social development of the country. Referring to Pakistan's proposal of five-nation conference on nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia, the prime minister said China supports our proposal. China and Pakistan have also worked together at multilateral forums for achieving the goal of nuclear nonproliferation at regional and global levels.

On Afghanistan, the prime minister said our policy underlines the promotion of conciliation, harmony, and consensus among Afghans, preservation of Afghanistan's unity and territorial integrity, and support for its reconstruction.

#### **Nuclear Scientist Qadeer Khan Interviewed**

*BK0202155393 Rawalpindi NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 26 Jan 93 pp 28, 29, 87*

[Interview with Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Qadeer Khan by unnamed correspondent; from the *FAMILY MAGAZINE*; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] [Correspondent] The Kahuta nuclear plant is being talked about throughout the world. This project has been attributed to you. Would you tell us about the peaceful purposes the plant has been established for?

[Khan] This is an era of technology, and nuclear technology is most essential in today's world. The primary objective of the Kahuta plant is to conduct nuclear research. We can utilize this technology for numerous needs. But our enemies feel that the plant has only one objective. I feel this is because of their guilty conscience. They themselves stole a technology and then used it for producing nuclear weapons instead of using it for their people's welfare. In fact, people with a limited perception have a limited vision as well.

This plant is being used only for enriching uranium, and the enriched uranium is then used as fuel in nuclear reactors. The enriched uranium will be utilized as fuel in the 300-megawatt nuclear power plant which we are acquiring from China. This will not only ensure our self-reliance, but will save us considerable foreign exchange.

[Correspondent] You have succeeded in breaking the Western monopoly in enriching uranium. Would you tell us about this achievement?

[Khan] Basically, all developed countries have identical views. They do not want to see the developing nations of the Third World to acquire high expertise and technology. The main reason for this is that they want to maintain their



exclusive control in order to keep developing and other countries under their domination and to maintain their own predominance. Their attitude toward Muslim countries particularly is more tough.

Enrichment of uranium is a very complicated scientific process under which the strength of raw uranium is enhanced several thousand times. We have achieved expertise in this field despite our inadequate facilities and very meager investment.

Centrifuge technology is the world's most modern technology and by acquiring this technology we have been able today to stand in the row of developed countries which have expertise in this field. Only five countries in Europe have this expertise, while Japan has achieved some success in this field only at the laboratory level, and India is like an elementary school child in this matter.

[Correspondent] A false litigation was filed against you in the Netherlands. By the grace of God, you successfully overcame it. How you did you feel when you were acquitted?

[Khan] As has been proved at the High Court, the case was based on malice. I was aware of the fact that I did not commit any unethical act or crime, and had complete faith in God. Therefore, God helped me to overcome the difficulty and the enemy was badly beaten. Dutch lawyers Dr. Russel and Late Dr. Dean Driver, and Pakistani lawyers S.M. Zafar and M.B. Zaman shattered the government allegations. The attorney general of Netherlands told my lawyers that he would not have recommended taking up the case to the court if his opinion was sought by the government. There was no substance in the case. The Netherlands government could appeal at the Supreme Court if it wished to. But displaying prudence and taking the reality into consideration it decided not to appeal. Thus, the case was

dismissed in my favor. In the meantime, I enjoyed the blessings of the entire nation, and I thank everyone for this.

[Correspondent] You have done vast research work on missiles. Missiles produced at your plant have also been displayed on various occasions. Would you tell us something in detail about it?

[Khan] There have been a number changes in all aspects of life. The science of warfare too is much different from what it was during World War I. Air warfare now assumes the greatest importance in a contemporary war. We have done much work in this field, too, and by the blessing of God we have achieved some success as well. The Pakistani armed forces' capability to counter the enemy has been enhanced due to our achievement in the field of missile production. We made considerable progress due to the wholehearted assistance by Late Army Chief General Asif Nawaz. God willing, we will also work for the Air Force and the Navy.

[Correspondent] Certain scientific organizations are working under your supervision. Have you offered any proposals for the development of science in the country?

[Khan] Yes, I have suggested possible measures to the government from time to time for the advancement of science. The Ishaq Khan Technical Institute is an example of this. Science and technology are very important in this era and any nation which pushes this fact to the back burner now will not have any standing in the 21st Century. Our survival lies in education, especially that of the younger generation, as it is said that the future of any nation lies in the education of its younger generation. Our prophet had stated hundreds of years ago that even if one has to go to China to acquire knowledge, one should do so. A very bold step is needed to improve our educational system, otherwise we will not survive as an independent nation. [passage omitted]

## RUSSIA

**DPRK Should 'Unconditionally' Observe NPT***OW0502161393 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1552 GMT 5 Feb 93*

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Dmitriy Voskoboinikov, Igor Porshnev, and others from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] Russia has presented China with a new interpretation of the first paragraph of the friendship and co-operation treaty of 1961, according to which military support would be given to North Korea in the event of an unprovoked direct attack on the nation. The above was announced at a Moscow briefing Friday [5 February] by Georgiy Kunadze, Russia's deputy foreign minister, who had recently returned from a visit to Pyongyang. Kunadze held consultations in the North Korean capital with representatives of the North Korean leadership in the capacity of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's special representative.

Kunadze also admitted that Moscow expected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be observed unconditionally by the North Koreans and more dialogue with Seoul. In his opinion, the unification of North and South Korea was in the interests of Russian national security since it would mean the removal of tension from the Russian border region.

The deputy minister said that the consultations had demonstrated that the views of the two nations did not fully coincide. He did say that this could be expected, however. He was in favour of developing relations between Moscow and Pyongyang so that these became more stable and less dependent on the political state of affairs. Russia, he pointed out, would be guided by different principles from those of the USSR, working on the premise of priority for its national interests and the principles of international, civilised relations. [passage omitted]

**Kunadze Interviewed on DPRK N-Arms***SK0502000493 Seoul MBC Television Network in Korean 1200 GMT 3 Feb 93*

[Report on an "exclusive" interview with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Kunadze by MBC correspondent Ko Tae-sok at Scheremetyevo Airport in Moscow upon Kunadze's return from Pyongyang on 2 February; Kunadze responds in Russian, translated from Korean subtitles—passages in quotation marks recorded]

[Text] [Ko Tae-sok] In an exclusive interview with MBC News at Scheremetyevo Airport on 2 February, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Kunadze said he asked North Korea to abolish the clause on military alliance in the DPRK-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance stipulating the Soviet Union's automatic military intervention in case a dispute occurs in North Korea.

[Georgiy Kunadze] "We discussed the Russian proposal to abolish the clause on military alliance. We are waiting for the North Korean side to respond."

[Ko] He also said that Russia's basic position is to support nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and that Russia strongly urged North Korea to faithfully carry out its obligation as stipulated in the treaty now that the North Korean side has signed it.

[Kunadze] "North Korea has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and we urged them Korea to implement this treaty completely."

[Ko] Deputy Foreign Minister Kunadze said that the Russian side explained to the North Korean side that since the nuclear powers—the United States and Russia—have signed the historic START II, a rapid reduction of nuclear weapons will be pushed forward soon. Deputy Foreign Minister Kunadze said that Russia stressed to North Korea that nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has emerged as a serious international issue. He explained that the important point in whether North Korea has nuclear weapons is not the existence of nuclear weapons but the technological potential. When asked if he thinks North Korea has nuclear weapons, Kunadze said:

[Kunadze] "Whether nuclear weapons exist or not is not important. As far as I am concerned, I doubt they exist."

[Ko] Deputy Foreign Minister Kunadze reminded the North Korean side that it has not signed the Chemical Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty, and he urged them to sign it.

[Kunadze] "We discussed the nonproliferation of chemical weapons and a total ban on chemical weapons. The treaty on this was signed in Paris sometime ago. We urged North Korea to sign this treaty as well."

[Ko] Referring to Russian-North Korean relations, Deputy Foreign Minister Kunadze said that their relations are not the special relations they had in the past but that Russian-North Korean relations will become relations of economic interests free from ideological bonds.

[Kunadze] "Russian-North Korean relations will develop on the basis of freedom from ideological bonds and on freedom of choice. Economic matters are important now. We hope North Korea will repay the debt they owe us."

[Ko] He said that during his visit to North Korea the two sides discussed extensively the international situation as a whole, including Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula, adding that the Russian side explained to the North Korean side that stability on the Korean peninsula also conforms with Russia's interests.

**Defense Workers Reportedly Tried To Go to DPRK***LD0402183593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1800 GMT 4 Feb 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Evgeniy Tkachenko]

[Text] Chelyabinsk February 4 TASS—A group of over 60 Russian defence researchers tried to leave for North Korea last October where they were offered a monthly salary of 1.5-4,000 US dollars, according to the CHELYABINSKI RABOCHIJ newspaper, which quoted local security officers.

All the researchers worked at defence enterprises and more than 40 of them were from the machine-designing bureau in Miass.

The composition of the group allowed it to create a warhead for a nuclear missile, according to experts of the Russian security ministry.

The group was detained in the Moscow International Sheremetyevo-2 Airport and was kept for two months in a rest house near Moscow.

The newspaper said that although the organisers of the trip were not found, each of the scientists received 40,000 roubles from them and left for home.

Some of them resumed work at their enterprises, others are still hoping to leave abroad, the newspaper said.

#### Reaction to Trade in Nuclear Materials

##### Militia General Urges Curbing Trade

PM0202153393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
2 Feb 93 p 1

[Report by Yuriy Kovalenko: "International Crooks Trying to Exploit Nuclear Seam"]

[Text] Despite the exposures and allegations of journalists, no cases of illegal trade in or transportation of nuclear raw materials or radioactive substances necessary for the manufacture of nuclear weapons have been recorded in a single country in the world so far.

That statement was made in conversation with your correspondent by Militia Lieutenant General Vasiliy Ignatov, chief of Interpol's National Central Bureau in Russia. Journalists who have produced television programs and written articles on the purchase of enriched uranium in Russia were either duped by the crooks whom they sincerely wanted to expose or else they sometimes exaggerated.

Russia, V. Ignatov reported, addressing the meeting at Interpol, is reinforcing the protection of its nuclear raw materials. The corresponding draft law is now being examined by the Russian Supreme Soviet, new articles have been introduced into the Russian Criminal Code, and a number of major measures have been adopted at government level.

Nevertheless, the overall picture in the world today is quite worrying, the militia lieutenant general acknowledged.

The police forces of various countries, Vasiliy Ignatov said, have noted that the old international crooks with a criminal record are now working in this "nuclear" sphere. They have found a new "seam" now and they are working it. But arms dealers, who are serious-minded people, do not do this kind of thing.

There is undoubted interest in these substances which exist in quite large quantities, they are in great demand, and they are widely used in medicine and in industry. If the police do not now quickly establish order in the detection and prevention of this illegal transportation and trade, it will become a very serious problem in the future.

##### Interpol Chief Says No Illegal Sales Registered

LD0502143193 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service  
in English 1219 GMT 5 Feb 93

[Commentary by Valeriy Chebotaryev]

[Text] The chief of the National Central Bureau of the Interpol, Lt. Gen. Vasiliy Ignatov has said that so far no country of the world has registered cases of illegal sales or transit of radioactive materials necessary for the production of nuclear arms. Radio Moscow's Valeriy Chebotaryev comments:

The chief of the Interpol Bureau in Russia says that those journalists who have reported the sales of enriched uranium in Russia either fell victim to swindlers or misinterpreted events. At the same time, General Ignatov is far from idealizing the situation. He says that the situation in the world leads no room for complacency.

Such concern is quite natural. However influential, Interpol is unable to fully control international crime. For that reason one cannot rule out the risk of covert operations to smuggle raw materials and components for nuclear arms. Incidentally, there have been some attempts to smuggle radioactive materials from the territory of the former USSR. Those materials could not have military uses, though. It is hard to guarantee that in the future nobody would try to lay hands on nuclear materials for nuclear weapons, however. In that connection worthy of note are reports of attempts by international crime syndicates to establish contacts with criminal gangs in the former USSR in order to acquire components for the manufacture of nuclear arms. One cannot but bear in mind such a factor as the reduction of strategic arms, which would make 600 tonnes of arms uranium and 120 tonnes of plutonium redundant in Russia. This poses the problem of keeping those nuclear materials in safety. Lastly, there is the crisis in the Russian economy and it has affected the uranium industry, too. In a situation like this there is a certain risk that some forces, on the pretext of maintaining a major industry, may try to bypass international agreements, establishing control of international trade in nuclear raw materials.

So the risk of a leakage of nuclear materials from Russia for the production of nuclear arms does exist. The same applies to other countries having nuclear potential. As for Russia, it has enhanced the protection of its nuclear materials. An appropriate draft law is already being studied by the Supreme Soviet. New articles have been introduced into the criminal code. A number of serious measures have been taken at government level. International cooperation in that field has been stepped up. For instance, at the initiative of the International Atomic Energy Agency, there was an emergency conference last December on the problem of



control of redundant plutonium. It is very important to step up efforts along these lines. Only this can prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms.

### **Decree Issued on Export Controls**

935D0248A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian No 18, 28 Jan 93 p 3

["Decree No. 1005 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 21 December 1992: On Procedure of Exports and Imports of Nuclear Materials, Technology, Equipment, Installations, Special Nonnuclear Materials, Radioactive Sources of Ionizing Radiation, and Isotope Products"]

[Text] For the purpose of a tightening of control of exports and imports of nuclear materials, technology, equipment, installations, special nonnuclear materials, radioactive sources of ionizing radiation, and isotope products the Government of the Russian Federation decrees:

**Confirmation of the Regulations Governing the Procedure of Exports and Imports of Nuclear Materials, Technology, Equipment, Installations, Special Nonnuclear Materials, Radioactive Sources of Ionizing Radiation, and Isotope Products (appended).**

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin  
Moscow

### **Regulations Governing the Procedure of Exports and Imports of Nuclear Materials, Technology, Equipment, Installations, Special Nonnuclear Materials, Radioactive Sources of Ionizing Radiation and Isotope Products**

1. These regulations regulate exports from the Russian Federation and imports into the Russian Federation of nuclear materials (including fresh and spent reactor fuel), technology, equipment, installations, and special nonnuclear material used to produce nuclear materials and also radioactive sources of ionizing radiation, including radioactive waste, and isotope products (radioactive and artificially obtained stable isotopes). These regulations extend to all commodities incorporated in subgroups 2612, 2844, 2845, and 3401 of the Commodity List of Foreign Economic Activity (TN VED) and in subgroup 2803 of the TN VED in respect to nuclear-pure graphite.

Exports and imports include transfer (sale or purchase) for commercial purposes and transfer of a noncommercial nature (for demonstration at exhibitions and joint operations).

Exports and imports of nuclear materials, technology, equipment, installations, and special nonnuclear materials are hereinafter called nuclear exports and nuclear imports; definitions of nuclear materials, technology, equipment, installations, and special nonnuclear material are contained in Appendix 1.

The procedure determined by these regulations is binding on all subjects of economic activity on the territory of the Russian Federation, regardless of form of ownership, affiliation, and place of registration.

2. Exports and imports controlled by these regulations are undertaken in accordance with licenses issued by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation (MVES of Russia) based on fixed-specimen applications preliminarily agreed by the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (Minatom of Russia). The licenses are issued to legal persons with permission of the Federal Inspection of Russia for Nuclear and Radioactive Safety (Gosatomnadzor of Russia) for the practice of a particular type of activity in the sphere of the use of atomic energy, including the production, use, storage, and/or shipment of the corresponding materials.

3. For reconciliation of the applications for the issuance of export licenses the applicant presents to the Minatom of Russia the following materials:

a) documents confirming the manufacturer of the export items, and for nuclear materials and radioactive sources of ionizing radiation, permission of the Gosatomnadzor of Russia for the manufacturer for the corresponding production activity;

b) the agreement for the supply of the export items (if a broker- organization is the exporter) and a document confirming the absence of restrictions on the part of the manufacturer on their delivery overseas;

c) permission of the Gosatomnadzor of Russia granted the applicant for the corresponding activity involving the handling of nuclear materials and radioactive sources of ionizing radiation (given exports thereof);

d) a signed or initialed contract (understanding) on the transfer of the export items to the recipient country;

e) in the event of nuclear exports, documents confirming compliance with the conditions set forth in Clauses 4-7 of these regulations.

4. Russia's nuclear exports are undertaken in accordance with its commitments ensuing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and other international treaties and accords of the Russian Federation. In instances which fall outside of the requirements of Clause 5 the question of the expediency and conditions of nuclear exports is decided by the Minatom of Russia in conjunction with the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation and the Commission for Export Control of the Russian Federation under the auspices of the Government of the Russian Federation.

5. Nuclear exports to countries which do not possess nuclear weapons may be undertaken given assurances on the part of the competent official authorities of such countries that the export items which they receive and also the nuclear and special nonnuclear material, installations, and equipment produced on the basis thereof or as a result of their use:

a) will not be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear firing devices or for the achievement of any military purpose;

b) will be under the supervision (safeguards) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) throughout the period of their actual use, in accordance with an agreement on

safeguards between the recipient country and the IAEA encompassing this country's entire peaceful nuclear activity;

c) will be provided with measures of physical protection at levels no lower than those recommended by the IAEA;

d) will be reexported (exported) or transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient country only on the terms specified in this clause; in the event of uranium enriched over 20 percent, plutonium, or heavy water, the export items proper will be reexported or transferred only given the written consent of the Minatom of Russia.

6. The assurances specified by Clause 5 of these regulations must be formalized by the official authorities of the recipient countries by way of their confirmation of the commitments in connection with supplies from the Russian Federation or by way of a reference to their commitment ensuing from current multilateral or bilateral treaties, agreements, and other treaty-legal instruments to which the recipient country and the Russian Federation subscribe. The conformity of these assurances to the commitments specified in Clause 5 is established by the Minatom of Russia following consultation with the Foreign Ministry of Russia. Such assurances are not required in respect to supplies of the nuclear and special nonnuclear material specified in Appendix 2.

7. The exporting organization is required to notify the Minatom of Russia of the shipment of nuclear export items within the timeframe and in accordance with the rules according to Appendix 3. Right up to the transfer of responsibility for the nuclear export items to the recipient the exporting organization is responsible for their provision with measures of physical protection at levels no lower than those recommended by the IAEA.

In the event of violations of the requirements specified in this clause, the license granted for nuclear exports is canceled, the exporting organization bears responsibility for the violations in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation, and new licenses may be granted no sooner than one year following cancellation of the license.

8. In the event of the recipient country violating the assurances specified by Clause 5 of these regulations, nuclear exports from the Russian Federation to this country must be terminated until an end has been put to the said violation. Simultaneously with termination of the exports the Foreign Ministry of Russia adopts in conjunction with the MVES of Russia and the Minatom of Russia measures in accordance with the rules of international law and international treaties pertaining to assurance of the recipient country's compliance with the commitments it has assumed. The Foreign Ministry of Russia notifies of the said instances the Commission for Export Control of Russia.

9. For the reconciliation of an application for the issuance of an import license the applicant presents to the Minatom of Russia the following documents:

a) a permit of the Gosatomnadzor of Russia granted the applicant for the corresponding activity involving the handling of nuclear material and radioactive sources of ionizing radiation (given imports thereof);

b) a signed or initialed contract (understanding) on the transfer of import items to the Russian Federation;

c) permission of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation, given imports of radioactive sources of ionizing radiation and isotope products for medical use;

d) in the event of nuclear imports, documents specifying information on the organization (enterprise) for which the imported items are intended and containing a commitment to comply with the requirements set forth in clause 10 of these regulations.

10. The importing organization is required to notify the Minatom of Russia of the acquisition of nuclear import items within the timeframe and in accordance with the rules according to Appendix 3. Nuclear import items must be provided with measures of physical protection at levels no lower than those recommended by the IAEA; accounting documents making it possible at any time to determine their quantity and whereabouts must be maintained in respect to them; they may be reexported from the Russian Federation only with the permission of the Minatom of Russia in compliance with the rules for nuclear exports specified by these regulations.

In the event of violations of the requirements specified in this clause, the license granted for nuclear imports is canceled, the importing organization bears the responsibility for the violations in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation, and it may be granted new licenses no sooner than one year following cancellation of the license.

11. In the event of the exporting country demanding that Russia make available assurances in respect to the peaceful nature of the use of nuclear import items, their physical protection, and reexport rules and also (in accordance with bilateral accords of the Russian Federation) in respect to their envelopment by IAEA safeguards, the question of the granting of such assurances is decided by the Minatom of Russia.

12. Questions of the regulation of exports and imports of categories of items determined in Clause 1 of the regulations not specified by these regulations are decided by the Minatom of Russia, the Commission for Export Control of Russia (in respect to exports), and the MVES of Russia in accordance with enforceable enactments of the Russian Federation.

**Appendix No. 1 to the Regulations Governing the Procedure of Exports and Imports of Nuclear Materials, Technology, Equipment, Installations, Special Nonnuclear Material, Radioactive Sources of Ionizing Radiation, and Isotope Products**

**Nuclear material, technology, equipment, installations, and special nonnuclear material**

1. Nuclear material—uranium (depleted, natural, or enriched, including uranium-233), plutonium, and thorium and any of these substances in the form of a metal, alloy, chemical compound, concentrate, and fresh or spent reactor fuel.

2. Technology—information, except information published in the open press, in any form (including material and equipment specimens and details transmitted in the training of specialists) which could be used for the design, manufacture, usage, or testing of nuclear material, equipment, installations, and special nonnuclear material.

3. Equipment and installations—all equipment and installations specially designed or prepared for the manufacture, reprocessing (treatment), or use of nuclear or special nonnuclear material, including hardware, which could be used for the manufacture of such equipment or individual components thereof, including:

3.1. Nuclear reactors and reactor equipment, including:

3.1.1. complete nuclear reactors capable of operating in a controlled self-sustaining chain fission reaction mode, except for zero-power reactors;

3.1.2. assembled high-pressure reactor vessels or their principal finished components specially designed or prepared for housing the nuclear reactor core and capable of withstanding the operating pressure of the coolant of the primary circuit;

3.1.3. machinery for the loading and unloading of the reactor fuel specially designed or prepared for the loading or extraction of the fuel from an operating nuclear reactor or possessing technical possibilities for the precision orientation or alignment of parts making it possible to perform on a shut-down reactor work on the recharging of the fuel;

3.1.4. reactor control rods specially designed or prepared for controlling the rate of the reaction in the nuclear reactor;

3.1.5. high-pressure reactor pipes specially designed or prepared for the placement therein of fuel elements and the primary circuit coolant in a reactor given an operating pressure in excess of 50 atmospheres;

3.1.6. zirconium pipes or metallic zirconium pipe assemblies or alloys thereof specially designed or prepared for use in a reactor in which the ratio in the weight of hafnium to zirconium is less than 1:500;

3.1.7. primary circuit pumps specially designed or prepared for maintaining the circulation of the molten metal which is the coolant of the primary circuit of nuclear reactors.

3.2. Installations for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements and equipment specially designed or prepared for this, including:

3.2.1. equipment for the separation and pulverizing of fuel elements affording access to the irradiated material such as specially designed scissors for cutting metal;

3.2.2. solvent tanks safe from the viewpoint of criticality, in which the nuclear material is dissolved in nitric acid;

3.2.3. equipment for extraction;

3.2.4. tanks for the interim and long-term storage of chemical compounds;

3.2.5. complexes for the conversion of plutonium nitrate into plutonium oxide;

3.2.6. complexes for the production of metallic plutonium.

3.3. Installations for the manufacture of fuel elements, including equipment which directly processes or controls the flow of the nuclear material or seals the nuclear material within the jacket.

3.4. Installations for separating uranium isotopes and equipment specially designed or prepared for this, including:

3.4.1. gas centrifuges and also units and components specially designed or prepared for use in gas centrifuges, including their rotary and static components;

3.4.2. equipment, components, and auxiliary systems for gas centrifuge isotope-enrichment installations, including product and "tailings" removal systems, pipeline systems, and mass-spectrometers for the flow of uranium hexafluoride;

3.4.3. specially designed or prepared units and components for use in gaseous diffusion enrichment, including porous filters, diffuser chambers, compressors (gas blowers), their shaft seals, and heat exchangers for the uranium hexafluoride;

3.4.4. equipment, components, and auxiliary systems for isotope enrichment gaseous diffusion installations, including product and "tailings" removal systems, pipeline systems, vacuum systems, gate valves, and mass-spectrometers for the uranium hexafluoride flow;

3.4.5. systems of separation by the propulsive nozzle method, vortex separation, and other methods.

3.5. Plants and installations for the production of heavy water, deuterium, and its compounds and equipment specially designed or prepared for this, including:

3.5.1. 6- to 9-meter-diameter water-hydrogen sulfide exchange columns and compressors (gas blowers) for gas containing more than 70 percent hydrogen sulfide specially designed or prepared for the production of heavy water-hydrogen sulfide exchange technology;

3.5.2. ammonia-hydrogen exchange columns with a height of 35 meters or more and a diameter from 1.5 to 2.5 meters, the internal equipment of the columns, and staggered pumps and installations for cracking ammonia and catalytic jets for the conversion of enriched gaseous deuterium into heavy water specially designed or prepared for the production of heavy water using ammonia-hydrogen exchange technology;

3.5.3. infrared absorption analyzers for the routine analysis of the hydrogen-deuterium correlation, given deuterium concentrations equivalent to or over 90 percent.

4. Special nonnuclear materials:

4.1. deuterium and heavy water:

deuterium, heavy water (deuterium dioxide), and other any compound of deuterium in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen is in excess of 1:5,000;

4.2. nuclear-pure graphite:



graphite with a degree of purity higher than 5 million parts of boron equivalent and a density of more than 1.5 grams per cubic meter;

4.3. material for the manufacture of porous filters per clause 3.4.3:

chemical compounds or powders, including nickel or alloys with a content of 60 percent of nickel or more, aluminum oxide, or fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers with a purity of 99.9 percent or more, particle dimensions of less than 10 micrometers, and a high degree of particle dimension homogeneity specially prepared for the manufacture of porous filters for the gaseous diffusion separation of isotopes of uranium.

**Appendix No. 2 to the Regulations Governing the Procedure of Exports and Imports of Nuclear Materials, Technology, Equipment, Installations, Special Nonnuclear Materials, Radioactive Sources of Ionizing Radiation, and Isotope Products**

**Nuclear and special nonnuclear materials in respect to which, in accordance with Clause 6 of the regulations, assurances are not required**

**1. Nuclear materials:**

quantities not exceeding for an individual recipient country within a calendar year the limits specified in subclause "a" and the material specified in subclause "b":

a) enriched uranium, including uranium-233—50 effective grams (weight in effective grams is obtained by multiplication of the weight of the uranium in grams by the square of enrichment)

plutonium—15 grams

natural uranium—500 kg

depleted uranium—1,000 kg

thorium—1,000 kg;

b) plutonium with an isotope concentration of plutonium-238 of over 80 percent.

**2. Special nonnuclear materials:**

a) deuterium, heavy water, and other deuterium compounds:

not more than 40 kg of deuterium atoms (200 kg of heavy water) for an individual recipient country within a calendar year;

b) nuclear-pure graphite:

no more than 15 tonnes for an individual recipient country within a calendar year;

c) material for the manufacture of porous filters per clause 3.4.3 of Appendix 1:

no more than 5 tonnes for an individual recipient country within a calendar year.

**Appendix No. 3 to the Regulations Governing the Procedure of Exports and Imports of Nuclear Materials, Technology, Equipment, Installations, Special Nonnuclear Materials, Radioactive Sources of Ionizing Radiation, and Isotope Products**

**Forwarding of information on nuclear exports and imports**

1. Enterprises and organizations providing supplies for export and receiving by way of imports nuclear materials and special nonnuclear materials and also undertaking exports of technology, equipment, and installations independently or via foreign trade organizations send notification to the organization of the Minatom of Russia TSNII-Atominform (Central Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Science and Technology Information and Technical-Economic Research) responsible for the registration of nuclear exports and imports at the following address:

TSNIIAtominform,

Box 971, Moscow 127434

Teletype: 114088 ZALIV

Fax: (095) 976-72-03

Telephone: (095) 210-83-47

2. Notice of exports or imports of nuclear materials is forwarded to the TSNIIAtominform no later than five days following the actual date of the shipment or receipt of the consignment of the material. Standard forms acquired ahead of time in the TSNIIAtominform together with the instructions for their completion are used for the notices.

3. Notice of exports or imports of special nonnuclear materials is forwarded to the TSNIIAtominform no later than five days following the actual date of the shipment or receipt of the consignment of material with the following information being supplied:

**Notice of exports (imports)**

Designation (number) of the consignment of material

Designation and form of the material

Weight of the material

Shipper (country and organization)

Consignee (country and organization)

Date of shipment (for exports) or receipt (for imports).

4. In the event of exports of technology, equipment, and installations, notice should be forwarded to the TSNII-Atominform in the form of free wording no later than 30 days following completion of the transfer of the export item. If the shipment takes place over a prolonged period of time (more than one year), the information is forwarded no later than 30 days following completion of the calendar year with details as to the actual shipment of the export items in the past year.

5. Aside from the said notices to the TSNIIAtominform, information on planned exports from the Russian Federation of nuclear material of Canadian or Australian origin, including the product and "tailings" obtained as a result of enrichment of the material in Russia, is forwarded no later than a day after the shipment of consignments of such material to the Minatom of Russia Committee for International Relations at the following address:

Committee for International Relations of the Minatom of Russia,  
26, Staromonetnyy pereulok,  
Moscow 109180  
Teletype: 114046 ARGUS  
Fax: (095) 230-24-20  
Telephone: (095) 239-29-26

The forwarded information should include the following:

**Notice of planned exports**

Designation (number) of the consignment of material  
Designation and form of the material  
Weight of the element (uranium, plutonium, or thorium)  
Weight of the fissionable isotope (only for enriched uranium)  
Shipper (country and organization)  
Consignee (country and organization)  
Data of shipment  
Owner of the material (if known).

6. The TSNIIAtominform forwards information pertaining to nuclear exports to the Commission for Export Control of Russia and the Gosatomnadzor of Russia quarterly.

**Authorities' Failure To Stop Rare Metal Exports Hit**

PM0102115593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
29 Jan 93 p 3

[Report by correspondent Aleksey Boldinyuk: "Metals Stream Abroad"]

[Text] Helsinki—Last year was not the most successful year for world producers of rare metals. Prices on the international markets took a considerable tumble, despite attempts to keep the situation in check by reducing output, particularly the output of aluminum and nickel. All the efforts were nullified by the uncontrolled flow of metals from the former Soviet Union, however.

The bulk of the metals illegally exported to the West goes, as is well known, via the Baltic states. Estonia, which has no deposits of its own, has become one of the world's biggest exporters of nonferrous metals. Recently the Swedish customs detained two Estonian citizens in Stockholm who had 300 grams of scandium in their possession. The price per kilo of this extremely rare metal is around \$100,000. As it turned out, the customs officials had discovered only a test consignment; the Estonians were intending to conclude a contract worth more than \$10 million. But it would be unfair to blame the Balts alone for this. The reason for the growing export of metals from the former USSR lies, in the opinion of Western specialists, in the uncontrolled nature of prices in the domestic market or, put more broadly, the total chaos reigning in Russia's economic area.

The prices for titanium, for example, reach \$12,000 on world markets. In our country they are six times lower. In such conditions Russians find it very difficult to resist the temptation, according to Sten Lyutman [name as transliterated], leading researcher at the Stockholm Eastern Economics Institute. Order can be instilled in the Russian

metallurgical sector, he writes in SVENSKA DAGBLADET, but this requires political will political will on the part of the authorities; who, by all accounts, are occupied with other problems.

Meanwhile in 1992 West European plants obtained around 40,000 tonnes of nickel disguised as low-grade metal. The right obtained by certain enterprises to export their output is, as the Scandinavian press points out, used for the overt and covert export of strategic raw material and nonferrous metals. How much the state loses and the mafia, which controls the flow of contraband, gains by this, no one is venturing to say.

The destruction of nuclear missiles since the signing of the arms reduction treaty by Russia and the United States has been making the inhabitants of Scandinavia apprehensive. They think that enriched uranium will become more accessible in our country and become an object of illegal export like titanium and nickel. The impotence or reluctance of the Russian authorities to combat the growing flow of contraband reinforce those apprehensions.

**Arms Dealers Reportedly Circulating Sales Videos**

LD0602115393 Hamburg DPA in German 0245 GMT  
6 Feb 93

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—According to a report in DER SPIEGEL news magazine (Monday edition), Russian firms intend to boost arms exports with the help of German dealers. Sales videos for Russian weapons systems are said to be circulating in Germany for the first time, the magazine says. The promotional films—which the magazine says have now been examined by the Federal Intelligence Service in Pullach and the Customs Criminal Investigation Office in Cologne—show new mobile anti-aircraft systems and new types of laser-guided missiles. They have been sent to the addresses of suitable arms dealers in Germany, the magazine reports.

Russian dealers are said to increasingly be offering for sale in the West bacterial strains for bio-weapons from military research laboratories in the former Soviet Union. According to experts, crime syndicates could also be interested in biological warfare materials that are capable of causing plagues.

Arms are also said to have been supplied to Russia from Germany. A German firm's firearms worth 1.2 million marks were supplied from Frankfurt to Nizhniy Novgorod (formerly Gorkiy), the magazine said. The article was pre-released to DPA in edited form.

**Further Reportage on FIS Proliferation Report**

93WP0078A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian  
29 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Stukalin: "Analytical Intelligence Report Presented: Intelligence Disturbed by Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Yesterday in Moscow there was a news conference of the leaders of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service [FIS],

at which an analytical report "New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" was presented.

Opening the news conference, the director of the Service, academician Yevgeniy Primakov, noted that the report—the first unclassified report in the history of Russian intelligence—was prepared on the basis of analysis of both open materials and information gleaned through specific operational methods. This document deals with relations between the superpowers and countries at different stages of access to nuclear weapons. FIS analysts divide these countries into three groups: access to them, "threshold," and "near threshold." In the opinion of intelligence experts, relations with "threshold" and "near threshold" states require a new approach which eliminates double standards and division into "friendly" and "unfriendly." "Russia has firmly entered on this path and is expecting the same thing from the West," emphasized Yevgeniy Primakov. Regarding specific Russian interests in the area of control of weapons of mass destruction, Primakov announced: "Russia is extremely interested in making sure that new countries in possession of these weapons do not appear on the perimeter of its borders."

In the FIS report special attention is paid to the need to step up both protection of Russian nuclear arsenals and control of the process of "nuclear brain drain," which is of an international nature. In the academician's opinion, it is still too early to speak about an outflow from Russia of scientists and engineers directly employed in the nuclear arms cycle,

since neither the FIS nor Western special services have information that any of them are already working in their specialty abroad. And the information that does come to the press from time to time is usually not confirmed and, according to the FIS version, could have originated in circles that are interested in diverting entire Russian intelligence subdivisions away from their main work.

But even today there is a danger from those specialists who work in areas related to the nuclear field and when traveling abroad could be used to arrange production of individual components of nuclear weapons. Gennadiy Yevstafyev, chief of the FIS administration handling these problems, added that this issue will become critical in the very near future unless the government can provide a worthy life for domestic scientists. Yevstafyev confirmed that there have been attempts to ship radioactive materials out of Russia, but at the level of individual and particular structures. Moreover, what they try to ship out are not components of nuclear munitions but slightly enriched materials used for industrial purposes. All these attempts are at the "amateur level" but intelligence is already noting a tendency to set up more permanent shipment channels.

KOMMERSANT experts observe that the information that has been given most likely represents only a small part of the results of the FIS work in this area. But the very fact that they are making it public shows that intelligence is seriously disturbed by the process of proliferation of nuclear weapons in third countries, which has gotten out of control in certain cases.

**Table 1. Existence of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery in countries of the Third World (according to data of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia)**

Country	Nuclear weapons	Chemical weapons	Biological weapons	Means of delivery
Algeria	No	No	No	Available
Argentina	No	No	No	Being developed
Brazil	No	No	No	Being developed
Egypt	No	Yes	No	Yes
Israel	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
India	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Iraq	No	Yes	No	Yes
Iran	No	Yes	No	Yes
DPRK	No	Analysis difficult	No	Yes
Libya	No	Yes	No	Yes
Pakistan	Yes	No	No	Being developed
Syria	No	Yes	No	Yes
Taiwan	No	No	No	Being developed
Chile	No	Yes	No	No
RSA	No	No	No	Being developed
South Korea	No	No	No	Yes

**Mirzayanov Interviewed on CW Development***MK2301144493 Moscow KURANTY in Russian  
23 Jan 93 p5*

[Interview with Vil Mirzayanov by Konstantin Katanyan; place and date not given: "They Wanted To Make Me the Scapegoat"]

[Text] [Katanyan] After the well-known piece in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI you found yourself behind bars. But a year before, after your first article in KURANTY, Mirzayanov was for some reason ignored by the competent agencies. So why was such careless negligence displayed at the time?

[Mirzayanov] I think this was linked with the fact that at that time the top leadership of our military-chemical complex, which was well versed in the rules of the game of misleading public opinion, resorted to a different weapon—silence. Although the article in KURANTY virtually coincided with the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI article entitled "Poisoned Policy," it did not spark a reaction among either the Russian or the foreign public.

But there was a reaction to the item nevertheless—at that very time I was fired from the institute where I had been working for the previous few years.

[Katanyan] As is known, soon after the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI item the American press carried information which was even more secret than what you had been talking about. So why are attempts made to place the entire blame for divulging state secrets on Mirzayanov? Do you not suspect an attempt thereby to conceal another source of the information that gets to the West?

[Mirzayanov] I think you are right. A month after the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI article the BALTIMORE SUN carried another article about the situation in terms of chemical weapons in Russia which cited what was indeed secret information. This testifies that foreign correspondents have independent channels of information. So my arrest had the objective not only of intimidating me and other experts in the field of chemical weapons but also of covering someone's tracks and diverting suspicion from the real sources of secret information and also from those in the West with an interest in obtaining this secret information.

[Katanyan] So why is an attempt being made to keep these people in the shadows? Who are they—well-known scientists or top officials in state structures?

[Mirzayanov] I believe that the people selling the country's secrets do not include real scientists or ordinary engineers. The top leadership is another matter; it is playing a game of its own. I fear that the top leadership of the U.S. military-chemical complex is also involved in this game.

The KGB, the leadership of the Ministry of the Chemical Industry, and the generals [generalitet] all have a material interest in providing themselves with a gravy train cloaked in secrecy. It was recently revealed that Petrunin, director of the State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, and the leadership of the Ministry of the Chemical Industry received a Lenin Prize for developing a

binary weapon based not on agent Novoye [Novoye veshchestvo], as stated in the official sources, but on agent Cheboksary [Cheboksarskoye veshchestvo]. Agent Novoye was held in reserve to be used to get another prize. Only unforeseen circumstances prevented them from getting it.

The same thing is happening now. Since we are disarming, destroying old weapons, and saving the world from them, why should we not publish information about our binary weapons of one kind or another. But this is not happening. So why is the military-chemical complex leadership keeping these secrets? It is clear that this is being done not in Russia's interests but in the interests of high-ranking officials capable of trading in the information they possess.

[Katanyan] Do you have information on who can transfer secret information to the West?

[Mirzayanov] Of course. Abroad there are three of our experts who are much better informed in the field of chemical weapons than I am. They know everything. They are now permanently resident in the United States and have a very good life there, to the best of my knowledge.

Of course they have not written about what they know in the newspapers or trumpeted about the danger of chemical weapons, although they know that our stockpiles are as high as 60,000-70,000 tonnes, by no means the 40,000 tonnes cited by General Kuntsevich, an academician and chairman of the Convention Committee under the Russian president.

[Katanyan] So how did the state security organs allow these people to go abroad?

[Mirzayanov] Either they were sent specially—meaning that the KGB sent them there for the purpose of spreading disinformation—or a blind eye was turned to their departure. But that means that somebody was benefiting. I know for a fact that many of my scientist colleagues would like to go to the United States and that people linked to secret work are simply not let out of the country. So KGB authorization was essential.

[Katanyan] The sanction used against you by the KGB in the shape of the Russian Ministry of Security was arrest. Did they not attempt to pressure you to admit your guilt?

[Mirzayanov] Everything boiled down to precisely that. During interrogation, when I was accused of giving away state secrets and damaging the country's defense capability, they very much wanted to have a record of my saying with my own lips that I had deliberately given away all this information obtained in connection with my professional post at the research institute.

At the time it might have been possible to pretend that nobody had given away any information to anyone. Then they would have managed to make me the scapegoat. But I did not give away any secrets in those articles, I only warned about the danger of continuing to produce new binary substances leading to the violation of the agreement with the United States on halting work in this field.

[Katanyan] Did they not attempt to apply physical or psychological measures against you?

[Mirzayanov] I was not allowed a lawyer, and the Chekists tried for a long time to impose a defense attorney from among their agents on me. Here they resorted to overt lies, claiming that my wife had agreed to the services of attorney Vasilyev, whom I rejected.



[Katanyan] Fortunately the court released you from custody. Do you think that if you had stayed behind bars you could have withstood the psychological pressure of prison?

[Mirzayanov] My being released from custody had not figured in the investigators' plans. They had not reckoned that I would be at liberty and would be able to legally divulge everything I knew. A lawyer may make a written commitment of nondivulgence, but I didn't make such a commitment.

But if I had been kept in prison it would have been very easy to fabricate a case. The atmosphere of total isolation and being cut off from the outside world drags a person down.

[Katanyan] We know well from history what dirty methods were used by the competent organs to get suspects to admit their guilt. Often criminals or informers would be planted in a cell with them. Did anything like that happen to you?

[Mirzayanov] For three days I was on my own in a cell for three. Then I refused to eat, sustaining my hunger strike for two days before being transferred to another cell.

There were two people in this other cell with me: One was accused of currency smuggling, the other of killing a KGB officer. It is hard for me to judge whether they were plants or not. In this field the KGB is unsurpassed by any other agency. But I don't want to besmirch my cell mates, especially since they gave me the idea of filing a complaint of unlawful arrest, after which the court freed me.

[Katanyan] The wave of press interest in your case has subsided somewhat now. Only PRAVDA continues with its counterpropaganda in an attempt to prove that you are guilty of at least slander.

[Mirzayanov] For me the KGB and PRAVDA are linked together in a single and indivisible whole. Only after the investigating bodies admit that they made a mistake and the case is closed will the KGB's obedient organ PRAVDA stop its brainwashing of readers aimed at misleading the public.

[Katanyan] Nevertheless I want to go back to the article in PRAVDA on 9 January in which State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology Director Petrulin, citing your official reports from 1986 and subsequent years, claimed that a control analysis of an air sample above the enterprise site showed no special product there. Did you really sign such reports?

[Mirzayanov] There is formal system of so-called emission monitoring. All plants have such a system. We know that they discharge thousands of tonnes of waste into the atmosphere, but laboratory analysis shows the reverse. This goes on until they are caught red-handed by monitoring agencies with a real interest in protecting the environment.

The enterprises' own monitoring services carry out analyses without having specialist equipment, however. For example, my department was called on to monitor leaks into the atmosphere of the new agent; the old ones did not interest us. Resistance to foreign technical intelligence consisted of preventing leaks of new information, known as "know-how."

At the same time, an entire engineering department—the gas decontamination department—was loading reactors with kilograms of a substance to be destroyed. Since the institute's laboratories were not provided with filters to prevent toxins being discharged into the atmosphere, Moscow's air was being constantly polluted.

The point isn't that we are fools or criminals. No. It's just that the top military-chemical leadership skimmed on ecology. Without filters, any handling of toxins leads to a leak.

[Katanyan] So the institute's staffers were also receiving a dose of toxins?

[Mirzayanov] Of course. Only an ignorant KGB agent could imagine that the numerous poisonings that occurred were the result of working with a sealed ampoule, as described in PRAVDA. I myself was poisoned. Many others were poisoned.

[Katanyan] You kept quiet about it?

[Mirzayanov] That is our tragedy. Because if you got poisoned, it was deemed to be either an accident or your own fault.

The victim was always to blame. That was our custom. But he was not the only one to be punished, they also demoted the chief of the subdivision responsible for the safety of operations. We were in the habit of calling a doctor only if someone was dying or suffered a serious injury.

I would be happy to invite the author of the PRAVDA article, who is trying to reassure the public, to come and do a tour of duty in our laboratory. I do not think he could stand the work, psychologically. Imagine you have to take a glass ampoule containing a military toxin, make an incision into it with a molybdenum or wolfram knife, break it open, and pour the contents into another ampoule or phial....

[Katanyan] Without a gas mask?

[Mirzayanov] You just can't do it in a gas mask. You are wearing gloves and you are working under a hood, of course. But the knowledge that you are holding in your hands not only your own death, but that of many others is oppressive even for the calmest people. Many people simply can't work with these substances.

[Katanyan] As I understand it, the title of the article, "Let's Wait a Bit Longer for the Destruction of Moscow," does not reflect the real state of affairs.

[Mirzayanov] It is not a question of waiting. Discharges must be stopped completely, so as to rule out that threat.

[Katanyan] So this threat is not ruled out today. Do you know of specific cases of accidents as a result of which not only the institute's staffers, but also inhabitants of the capital could have been poisoned?

[Mirzayanov] Yes. In February 1980, for instance, there was a fire in the laboratory's main block. Professor Georgiy Ivanovich Drozd and his colleagues were doing experiments. They put five 100-gram ampoules in a Kepler incubator. In order to speed up the experiment and to be

able to report on the results in good time, they deliberately left the incubator switched on overnight. During the night there was a surge in tension and the apparatus caught fire. A fire started, and was noticed by people crossing the bridge on the streetcar. Our own fire crew was asleep, as usual. The firefighters arrived in response to an "01" call, but at first they would not let them into the compound. But the firefighters swept aside the guards, reached the site of the blaze, and started putting the fire out with water. The water went all over them and they were enveloped in smoke.

They put the fire out and left. No one knows what has become of them today. If they are alive, I'm very pleased. But the smoke spread over Moscow, too. There was approximately 400 grams of the substance in the incubator. Not a single gram was found subsequently. Yet just one gram is enough to kill more than 100 people. Where did the smoke settle? Nobody inquired.

We had fires no more and no less often than other chemical institutes.

[Katanyan] There are plenty of these institutes in Moscow....

[Mirzayanov] Each with its leaks. But there are also very extensive leaks. For instance, after an experiment they wash the equipment with water from the mains. Where does it go? Into the sewage system, that is, into the ground.

During the war, at our plant there were tons of mustard gas which were not even buried, just poured into a hole. That went into the ground, too. That is why Petrunin is denying the existence of artesian wells.

Ask any worker—they really don't know about these wells. But I have a piece of paper written by the chief of the Health Ministry's Third Administration. It says that the artesian wells on the territory of the State Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology have been plugged.

[Katanyan] Which means they exist?

[Mirzayanov] Plugged means closed from above. How can you close something that does not exist? I found these wells to be polluted. The entire territory is contaminated, and substances are certainly filtering through the soil and getting into the water which you and I use.

The director could take the opportunity to obtain additional funds and decontaminate the territory. But he is concealing glaring facts. Why, one wonders?

[Katanyan] Why indeed?

[Mirzayanov] It is a continuation of a policy made by unclean hands. A poisoned policy.

In January A. Kozyrev signed the convention banning chemical weapons in Paris. But the new military toxin which had been under going tests at Russian testing grounds for 15 years did not go on the list of prohibited substances. Since that substance is not in the convention, we can produce and even sell it.

Another point. On 16 September B. Yeltsin signed a decree giving a list of chemical goods and semifinished products for the synthesis of chemical agents whose export from Russia

without license is prohibited. The list even includes a component of the American VX binary agent which Russia has never produced. But the components of agent Cheboksary are not on the list, the new agent and the semifinished products for its manufacture are not on the list. Hence the conclusion—they can be exported and sold.

One last thing, which I have not told anyone before. I have it on reliable authority that all the technical and technological documentation of our toxin production plants, beginning in 1985, was completely reworked for submission to the bodies responsible for verification of compliance with the Geneva Convention. Naturally, it was falsified. Or else why rework it? This act was planned under the totalitarian regime, prepared under Gorbachev, and carried out under the democrats, under the Yeltsin regime. Does this not explain the repressive actions against me?

People "at the top" realize that I am a skilled chemist, that I can speak out loud about this terrible thing, and that I am not afraid just because a secret provision on state secrecy will be used against me, a provision which they do not want to tell me about even now. This provision was deemed unlawful by the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, but now it is being applied again.

[Katanyan] What are you planning to do?

[Mirzayanov] I intend to send an open letter to the heads of state of Western countries: President Clinton, President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, and Prime Minister Major. I want to warn them that in Russia, despite the appearance of disarmament and democratization, people are persecuted for publicizing the dangerous intentions of the military-chemical complex. Intentionally or otherwise, President Yeltsin is promoting this. I accuse him of negligence, and I am prepared to describe his actions as a crime, unless the dangerous experiments with military toxins are stopped immediately.

### **Defense Ministry: Navy Has No Tactical Nuclear Weapons**

*OW0502143993 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1431 GMT 5 Feb 93*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian Defense Ministry has confirmed that all tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from ships, submarines and aircraft belonging to the Russian Navy in accordance with statements made by the Soviet president October 5, 1992 and the Russian president January 29, 1992. The weapons have been placed in central storage. The announcement was made by the Russian defense ministry's press center in response to a request addressed to the ministry regarding the above matter.

### **All Tactical N-Arms Removed from Ships, Subs, Planes**

*LD0402135293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1220 GMT 4 Feb 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Moscow 4 Feb—All tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from vessels, multi-purpose submarines, and aircraft of the naval forces, and placed in centralized storage. This has been done in accordance with statements by the USSR president dated 5 October 1991, and the president of the Russian Federation dated 29 January 1992. This news was circulated today by the press center of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

### Ukraine's Emergence as Nuclear Power Eyed

PM0502154593 Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian No. 5, Jan 93 (Signed to Press 26 Jan 93) pp 8-10

[Commentary by Arkadiy Moshes: "Nuclear Policy of a Non-Nuclear Country. Major New Military Power Has Appeared Alongside Russia"]

[Text] In less than 18 months Ukraine has succeeded in setting up its own Armed Forces, which are significantly larger than those of other former Soviet republics.

Ukraine is potentially the world's third largest nuclear power, and will remain such until the end of the millennium, if not forever.

The 276 strategic missile launchers stationed in the republic (over 1,200 nuclear warheads) and the several hundred nuclear charges for aircraft are too much of a temptation for politicians easily to let go of this arsenal.

The quantity of conventional weapons belonging to Ukraine (see table) now also determines to a considerable extent the regional balance of power in Eastern Europe. If you take into account the quality of arms and the combat readiness of troops, which were traditionally higher in western districts of the USSR, Ukraine's status as a leading military power in the region becomes obvious. By way of a comparison, we have taken the CSFR (before the split) and the FRG—the states in East and West Europe which possess the greatest quantity of conventional weapons.

Column one shows the situation as of 1 August 1992 for Ukraine, and as of 10 January 1989 for the CSFR and FRG.

Column two shows the ceilings established by the CFE Treaty.

	Ukraine		CSFR		FRG	
	1	2	1	2	1	2
Tanks	6,318	4,080	4,585	1,435	4,900	4,100
Armored Vehicles	7,689	5,050	4,900	2,050	6,840	3,440
Artillery	3,852	4,040	3,445	1,262	3,190	2,700
Aircraft	1,494	1,090	407	345	850	900
Helicopters	229	330	101	73	450	300

Kiev did not accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nor did it ratify START I, and it is not

obliged to comply with decisions adopted within the CIS framework. A situation is emerging where the state is free to conduct what is in practice a totally unrestricted policy in the military sphere.

The existing situation cannot be ignored any longer. It is vital to embark on serious military-political research and to elaborate a plan of action for Russia in respect of Ukraine.

### Nuclear Lobby in Parliament

Treaties must be observed. But international law is not so strict on promises. This may be why official Kiev, which is spending so much time on assurances regarding its commitment to nuclear-free principles, has in fact fulfilled not a single one of its promises.

Throughout the whole of last year various political forces successfully indoctrinated public opinion in favor of abandoning nuclear-free principles.

A powerful pro-nuclear lobby consisting of some top generals and nationalist party representatives has emerged in parliament. These deputies simply repudiate statements by the state's leaders. Thus General V. Tolubko, a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense Questions who at one time proposed elaborating a system for a defensive nuclear shield for Ukraine, declared when in Washington in September: "Ukraine will not necessarily abide by the dates and commitments enshrined in the Lisbon Protocol" (the protocol about Ukraine's accession to START I).

The idea of keeping nuclear weapons as a deterrent is shared by Supreme Soviet Chairman I. Plyushch. S. Khmara, an influential opposition leader, has repeatedly spoken in the name of deputies who believe that Ukraine should remain a nuclear power. Flexing its muscle, last April parliament adopted a special resolution in support of President Leonid Kravchuk's decision to suspend the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory, and in October it refused to approve the military doctrine, which was based on nuclear-free principles.

Ukraine's official position is also evolving under the influence of the lobbyists. In January last year it was promised to make Ukraine a nuclear-free state by 1994. In March the deadline was moved back roughly a year. Now no dates are mentioned at all on the grounds that nothing is said about this in the 1990 Declaration on State Sovereignty.

Kiev is demanding security guarantees in exchange for voluntarily abandoning nuclear weapons. The problem of guarantees is complex in itself (guarantees from whom, against whom?) and, combined with the question of compensation (Ukraine is hoping for \$1.2 billion at a time when the United States is prepared to offer just \$175 million in all), could mean that the question of nuclear disarmament altogether quits the realm of practical politics.

### Will Washington Lean on Kiev?

By edict of Kravchuk, all groupings of strategic nuclear forces stationed in Ukraine have been included in the country's Armed Forces. A Center for the Administrative Management of Troops of Strategic Nuclear Forces has been



set up. Separate rocket and space troops are being formed. It is hard to believe that such measures help to implement nuclear-free principles.

Is it advantageous for Ukraine to keep its nuclear potential?

This is a rhetorical question—it is advantageous for any state to sit at the "top table" and ensure its national security at minimum cost (between 7 and 12 percent of states' military budgets are spent maintaining the world's nuclear forces). Ukraine is in a position to service its nuclear arsenals—there is sufficient industrial might and there are enough trained personnel. The only problem concerns testing: Ukraine has no test ranges of its own.

Even leaving aside the possibility of the accession to power of a nationalist government not bound by any international commitments, the very fact of the appearance of a sixth nuclear power may prompt a chain reaction (how will Kazakhstan, India, or Pakistan behave?) and undermine the existing system of control over nuclear weapons.

In order to prevent this, the time has come for the world to stop turning a blind eye to obvious things and to demand an answer from Ukraine to the question of its nuclear future. Then to develop a policy concerning this country accordingly.

If the state is prepared to become nuclear-free, then we must agree in the process of multilateral talks on concrete deadlines for fulfilling obligations, the amount of international aid, the future use of fissionable materials, and also strict monitoring and verification measures. Unfortunately, in this respect START II is not a very useful document.

The results of the mid-January meeting between Presidents B. Yeltsin and L. Kravchuk, despite its obvious concentration on economic questions, may become a starting point for the negotiating process and end the existing tendency for Kiev and Moscow to carefully avoid discussing the problems of disarmament.

A continuation of the policy of procrastination must be perceived as proof of Ukraine's desire to become a nuclear state, and other mechanisms must be brought into operation.

I would not like to use the word "pressure" when describing the possible development of U.S.-Ukrainian relations. Circumstances require that states truly involved in the process of nuclear disarmament, and above all the United States, which has effectively assumed the task of regularly putting Ukraine back "on the right road" (after all, it was under U.S. influence that the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia resumed; it was Secretary of State J. Baker who secured Ukraine's signature of the Lisbon Protocol; and it is now Washington, not Moscow, that is making every effort to explain to Kiev the need to participate in the START process), occupy a firm, uncompromising position. To give way on questions of principle is effectively to submit to nuclear blackmail.

#### **Military Alliance With Russia? No!**

Judging from the excerpts of the Russian draft treaty on friendship and cooperation between the two countries

leaked to the press in October, Moscow was insisting on preserving a unified strategic area on the territory of the two countries—that is, was regarding Ukraine's relations with Russia as an alliance.

There are serious doubts as to the correctness of such an approach, and Ukraine's rejection of the draft treaty is added confirmation of this. In purely theoretical terms, it is more advantageous for Ukraine to draw closer to East European countries and to become the center of gravity in the region than to turn toward Russia and preserve the status of being "eternally in second place." Kiev is well aware of this. Last year Ukraine was extremely active in organizing military cooperation with its neighbors: Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria. It is not impossible that Ukraine's idea for a Baltic-Black Sea area will entail the establishment of military relations of varying intensity.

East European countries, in their turn, are interested in military cooperation with Kiev for military-technical reasons: Ukrainian plants can supply their spare parts and ammunition and update their combat vehicle stocks.

Kiev has declared its neutrality and its nonalignment with blocs, which allegedly prevented the country from joining CIS military structures. But the state's military doctrine, now in preparation, will allow Ukraine to join coalitions against a specific enemy.

Discussion of the question of enemies is quite a delicate matter, for Ukraine has no specific enemy. The draft military doctrine sees any state making territorial claims against Ukraine as a potential enemy. Unfortunately, there can still be only one interpretation of the allusion.

The Ukrainian Republican Party and the Ukrainian National Assembly have already put forward the thesis of the "Eastern threat," and the latter has called directly for the creation of an anti-Russian alliance composed of the Baltic states, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

In this context efforts to blame Russia for disorder inside Ukraine continue to leave a bad taste in the mouth. The introduction of coupons, for instance, was explained by the claim that Russia had not supplied cash, and price liberalization was attributed to the increased cost of Russian oil.

For various reasons, Russia could find itself drawn into confrontation, fraught with the danger of an arms race, with Ukraine, toward which the Eastern Europe states would gravitate.

A scenario like this would be a tragedy which can still be avoided. To do this, Russia must first abandon all hope of a military alliance with Ukraine, removing all grounds to speak of a revival of imperialism. Second, and more importantly, a regional East European policy must be vigorously activated. The region's countries need cooperation with Russia, both for arms production and for conversion. The lack of common borders means the former allies have less reason to fear Moscow's interference. The withdrawal of Russian troops has already led to a slogan: "No occupation, no occupiers!"—this testifies to a turn in public opinion toward Russia.

### Give Kiev the Fleet....

"Ukraine is a maritime power and should have its own Navy"—nobody will openly argue with this thesis of Kiev's politicians. Nevertheless, Ukraine's naval policy, for wholly understandable reasons, is virtually nonexistent.

The naval forces, which according to the plan are to include 100 ships and 40,000 personnel, which are intended to defend the state's coastline, to ensure the security of the economic zone, and to maintain a favorable operational regime in the region and to be capable even temporarily of going outside the Black Sea, at present consist of two ships—the flagship Slavutich, and the "mutinous" SKR-112.

They are overshadowed by the looming presence of the Black Sea Fleet alongside—the object of Kiev's dreams—which further complicates relations between Russia and Ukraine but which cannot be divided up before 1995. The Yalta agreement, which has been broken, incidentally, on a number of important points, means in reality that Russia currently provides the Black Sea Fleet with 96 percent of its weapons and ammunition, 98 percent of the resources for engineer munitions and equipment, 85 percent of fuels and lubricants, and so on. The fleet, which is not Russian, continues to be financed from our budget.

The fleet's physical deterioration through wear and tear, now obvious, makes it increasingly costly to maintain, and the aims driving Russia to stubbornly cling onto the fleet (after the departure from the Mediterranean and the reduction in Russia's shoreline) are not clear. After all, Russia's other fleets require increasing attention.

The moratorium on dividing up the fleet until 1995 means merely delaying the solution to the problem and wasting vital time. I think it would be to the advantage of Russia, not Ukraine, to find a radical way out of the existing situation, such as dividing up the Black Sea Fleet.

Russia is quite able to accept the conditions proposed by Ukraine and to yield a sizable part of the fleet to it. In exchange, we must try to acquire the right to use bases in the Crimea (important ones like the Kerch-Feodosiya test base, for instance). As a result, Ukraine will get what it requires for its own self-respect.

Russia, having rid itself of the need to maintain old ships, will be able to implement a program for constructing some modern, economical destroyers and small ships more suited to carrying out patrol duty, and transfer to them the proportion of the personnel wishing to serve under the Russian flag. At the same time, one of the most powerful anti-Russian cards will be knocked out of the hands of Ukraine's nationalists.

The Black Sea tangle is not a military problem. Preserving it, like solving it, changes nothing in the description of Ukraine as the major military power of Eastern Europe and potentially a nuclear power. It is already clear that it would be an unforgivable mistake to ignore the emergence of a new center of power in the region.

## BELARUS

### Parliament Ratifies START I Treaty

LD0402140093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1333 GMT 4 Feb 93

[By BELINFORM for TASS]

[Text] Minsk February 4 TASS—The Belarusian parliament ratified the START-I Treaty, the supplement to it and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as three other military agreements during a closed-door session on Thursday.

Mechislav Grib, member of the parliamentary presidium, told BELINFORM that other documents include the so-called Lisbon agreement on types of armaments, as well as the agreement with Russia on strategic armaments deployed in Belarus and an agreement on coordination of military activities with Russia.

He gave no further details.

### Russian Foreign Ministry Hails Stance

LD0802104693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0915 GMT 8 Feb 93

[Report by ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Nikishov]

[Text] Moscow, 8 Feb—A spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry has described the Belarus Supreme Soviet's recent decision to ratify the START I treaty and the Lisbon Protocol of 23 May 1992, which is part of the treaty, as a major contribution to nuclear disarmament. In light of a commitment made under the Lisbon Protocol, the Belarus Parliament also decided that the Republic of Belarus would accede to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state.

These important steps on the part of Belarus, the Russian diplomat said in an interview with an ITAR-TASS correspondent, "help to strengthen the system of nuclear non-proliferation, international security and, it goes without saying, the security of CIS states." According to the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry, Belarus's ratification of the START I treaty gives grounds for hoping that the treaty will soon join those international agreements that are already in force. As we know, the treaty has already been ratified by Russia, Kazakhstan, and the United States. A similar decision has not yet been made by Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed.

## GEORGIA

### Foreign Minister Denies Su-25 Sale to Iran

LD0502052393 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0400 GMT 5 Feb 93

[Text] Georgian Foreign Minister Aleksandr Chikvaidze has denied reports alleging that during a Georgian Government delegation's recent visit to Iran an accord was attained on selling Su-25 aircraft to Tehran, the ANI agency reports.

## KAZAKHSTAN

**Nazarbayev Insists on Safety of Nuclear Weapons**

AU0302214493 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 2100 GMT 3 Feb 93

[Interview with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev by Otto Hoermann in Vienna on 3 February—recorded; Nazarbayev statements in Russian with superimposed German translation]

[Text] [Hoermann] Mr. President, you have nuclear weapons. When will the disarmament of strategic weapons begin in Kazakhstan?

[Nazarbayev] First of all, the problem of intermediate-range missiles has been solved. They have been eliminated. They were eliminated on Kazakh territory. We have signed the START I treaty on strategic nuclear weapons, together with the United States, and we were the first to ratify START I. No other country has so far ratified START I. We will fulfill its conditions.

[Hoermann] Mr. President, sometimes it is said that you do not have the nuclear weapons under control, you do not know what is happening with these weapons. Can you say that these weapons are under control in Kazakhstan?

[Nazarbayev] This is not correct. Immediately after the demise of the Soviet Union, we founded the United Strategic Armed Forces. We put all strategic weapons under a common and unified command. I have visited these units, and I have visited the missile positions. Security there is absolute. There is a unified command. Each state, including Kazakhstan, has the technical possibility to veto the potential use of weapons from Kazakh territory.

[Hoermann] The president of the United States and the president of Russia each have a small suitcase with the operational code for the nuclear weapons. Do you also have something like that?

[Nazarbayev] We have given this suitcase to the commander-in-chief of the United Strategic Armed Forces. Thus, no one in the world need be afraid. The weapons cannot be used from Kazakh territory if I veto their use, however. The four presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have a special communications system, which permits a common decision always and everywhere.

## UKRAINE

**\$175 Million 'Not Enough' for Nuclear Disarmament**

OW0102175793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1734 GMT 1 Feb 93

[Report by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature—transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk who is taking part in the Davos world economic forum, drew attention of the western public to the problem concerning liquidation of

the strategic nuclear forces in Ukraine. According to mass media, the head of state once again repeated the thought about the necessity to compensate the material damage related to nuclear disarmament process in his public addresses.

Premier Leonid Kuchma formulated government's attitude with respect to this issue in his recent TV interview. "We should decide problems concerning destruction of nuclear weapons with Russia," he believes. In Kuchma's words, \$175 million proposed by the United States as a compensation for the destruction of strategic missiles are clearly not enough. "If U.S. President had put a question to his experts they would have told him about this," declared Kuchma.

IF [INTERFAX] Note: Mentioning a telephone talk between Kravchuk and Bill Clinton on January 26, presidential press secretary Vladimir Shlyaposhnikov drew attention to the fact that Clinton spoke "minimum about \$175 million." Meanwhile, Vyacheslav Chornovil, the leader of Ukraine's opposition Popular Rukh [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroika] (the major opposition force in the republic), believes, along with Kuchma, that the sum proposed by the Americans does not correspond to real requirements of the republic. Presenting calculations of experts, Chornovil said that Ukraine's expenditures to reduce nuclear weapons will constitute \$1.5-2 billion. Rukh's leader thinks that until there is an uncertainty in this issue the parliament should not be in a hurry to ratify START-I [as received] Treaty.

Yuriy Kostenko, Ukrainian ecology protection minister, called the problem to liquidate strategic missiles stationed on Ukraine's territory an extremely complex one in ecological, political, and economic aspects. According to him, the main problems concern further utilization of missile fuel.

Kostenko believes that the first round of the Ukrainian-Russian negotiations held near Kiev last week helped to find ways to speed up ratification of START-I Treaty by the Ukrainian parliament. The Minister who headed the Ukrainian delegation at the negotiations reported that the Russian party promised to present proposals concerning liquidation or utilization of components of nuclear weapons stationed on the Ukrainian territory within a month.

**Safety Issue Agreed on in Arms Talks With Russia**

PM0202095793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Feb 93 p 3

[Report by Anatoliy Polyakov: "Russia and Ukraine Clarify Positions on Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Now Things Depend on Quest for Compromise Solutions"]

[Text] Kiev—The talks in Kiev between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations on questions of implementing the START I Treaty and ensuring the nuclear and environmental safety of the strategic nuclear forces in these states have culminated in the drafting of three agreements that the governments of the contracting parties are to examine. The delegations, headed on the Russian side by Ambassador at Large Yuriy Dubinin and on the Ukrainian side by Yuriy

Kostenko, minister for environmental protection, agreed only on nuclear and environmental safety issues.

The most difficult issue raised during the talks concerns the status of strategic nuclear weapons. Ukraine says that Leonid Kravchuk must have technical control over preventing the launch of missiles. Moreover, Ukraine considers the arms and hardware on its territory to be its property. In time for the next round of talks specially created working groups consisting mainly of military experts will work out options for closing the gap between the sides' positions on this matter.

Various options for dismantling [razukomplektovaniye], transporting, and destroying nuclear munitions must also be

considered. On this issue Ukraine's position is determined by the quest for the greatest economic benefit. People here consider the \$175 million allocated by the United States for the destruction of nuclear weapons in Ukraine to be a very small sum. The intention is therefore to offer for sale the nuclear components released during missile salvage [utilizatsiya], and they would, moreover, prefer to see Russia as the customer.

The sides have finally learned one another's positions on the whole range of problems under discussion. During the month or so remaining until the delegations next meet, this time in Moscow, compromise solutions must be found to curb the nuclear monster to the sides' mutual benefit.



**GERMANY****Smugglers of Radioactive Material Detained**

*LD2301212993 Prague CTK in English 1920 GMT  
23 Jan 93*

[Text] Berlin Jan 23 (CTK correspondent)—The two Czech and two Slovak smugglers of radioactive material, who were detained on the Dresden-Berlin highway on Friday, are now remanded in custody in Cottbus, a spokesman of the local prosecutor's office confirmed to CTK today.

All of them are accused of threatening the environment. Punishment for this crime ranges from a financial penalty to a prison sentence of several years.

According to the German press, seized was a neutron emitter made in 1977. Only a low radioactivity was measured in the case in which it was transported because the half-life period of Californium is 2.6 years. The artificially produced radioactive chemical element is used mainly in medicine and in research.

German experts say the smugglers are probably amateurs because Californium was placed in a case of lead which is ineffective against neutron radiation. A paraffin wrapping would have been needed, the experts said.

**Intelligence Official Speaks on Third World N-Arms**

*AU0102144093 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG  
in German 30-31 Jan 93 p 1*

["eli"-initialed report: "Third World States Have Nuclear Arms"]

[Text] According to information of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), at least 10 Third World countries have weapons of mass destruction. In a lecture given to representatives of the business and political community in Stuttgart on Thursday night [28 January], BND Vice President Paul Muenstermann said that these countries also have the necessary delivery systems for these nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. One has to make the assumption that some of these states are trying to extend the range of their missiles. "This means that as soon as tomorrow the security of our country and of Europe may be immediately threatened," Muenstermann said.

The BND vice president rejected the view that, after the end of the East-West conflict, the BND has become superfluous. In the last two years, the government has made twice as many requests as before. He said that it is true that the tasks of the BND have changed, however: The intelligence service must now pursue its intelligence activities in crisis and conflict areas—particularly in the republics of the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, and the Near and Middle East. Moreover, the BND is focusing its intelligence work on illegal technology transfer, narcotics and arms trade, and international terrorism.

According to Muenstermann, as Germany's only foreign intelligence service, the BND will also play an important role for the Bundeswehr's future operations under UN mandate. The BND must be able to acquire information rapidly prior to such operations. This includes also the evaluation of foreign weapons systems. This is the only way to gather information that "preserve the lives and the health of our soldiers." The cooperation with other intelligence services, particularly European ones, will rise in importance.

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